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as a result of
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California.

fatalities is small

what

While the number of

have been, we can't minimize their
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One of the casualties of the Nimitz

as safe as we've come to

them to be,

contradiction in statements made

is

ic confidence in the

In fact, much of the confusion and
officials immediately after

the earthquake has added to the loss of credibility.
Efforts to s

our older

tructures built under archaic seismic

safety standards with retrofit programs began after the 1971 Sylmar quake and the
1987 Whittier Narrows quake.
questions.

Have

But these efforts have lagged, creating additional

resource

freeway and highway structures?
retrofit program?

and money been made available to retrofit

How are the

Which structures in Los
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ies established for the
les may not be safe, if any, in a

major earthquake?

Perhaps most important is determining now what needs to be

done to prevent other deadly and destructive collapses of state and local highway
structures, and how to provide money and manpower necessary to ensure to the
maximum extent possible the seismic safety of our entire system.
During the Special Session of the Legislature that convened on Thursday and
ended Saturday night, I introduced legislation, working with my colleagues around
the table and Caltrans, that would earmark $80 million in earthquake emergency
spending to match against federal money to result in a $320 million statewide
seismic safety retrofit program for state and local bridges.

These funds will be

used to assess needs and determine priority projects and then to fund the very
highest priorities on the retrofit program.
But it's important to add and understand that this is a down payment on
retrofitting our streets and roads.

This is $300 million on the state system;

it's only $20 million on the local system.

I think you're going to hear today of

a much greater need, particularly on local streets and roads.

It's a down

payment, and we may have to look at SCA 1 money, if that is successful, as far as
additional revenue in order to seismically improve and guarantee the integrity of
our highway system.

As the lessons learned in the October 17 quake are

translated into action, much more will be needed to make our bridges as safe as
possible and to restore confidence in our aging freeways and highways.
That's what this is about today.

The Committee wants to know what happened,

if we can determine that; to what extent we've learned from that; what's going to
be done different in the future; and what we're doing now to make sure that
everything in Los Angeles and other parts of California are safe so that
motorists, when they drive to work each morning and are sitting in
bumper-to-bumper traffic and look up at the four-level interchange in downtown
Los Angeles, know that it's not going to fall down on them if there's a tremor at
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We truly appreciate the State's and your committee's interest in the needs
of the City of Los Angeles and the needs of the entire State of California.
Without question, the need is one of federal, state and local
cooperation/collaboration to deal with what we know is a fact:

earthquakes will

occur, they have occurred, and will continue to occur in the State of California.
The method of funding for disasters of this nature in terms of recovery is
one which we should look at very seriously.

We believe that sources of financing

should be made permanent, that there should be the development of some source of
funds that is literally put in some type of reserve that will be available for
what we know will occur.

It is extremely important to do that prior to the

occurrence so that we are ready for it.

Truly, what is being considered today,

not only in the city, but in the state is, as you said, the down payment.

The

need for these funds can almost be said to be a known quantity for the
foreseeable future in the State of California.
On November 3, the Board of Public Works for the City of Los Angeles adopted
a seismic strengthening of existing bridges report, which has been forwarded to
the Mayor and the City Council.

I'd like to leave that for your information.

For the most part, it essentially shows that we'll probably have to spend
approximately $150 million in the city, just for city structures, those which are
under our control.

The rest of the report essentially is talking about the need

for the design capability to accomplish that task.

Also, we are talking about

another couple of million dollars for a restrainer program, essentially fixing
bridges with restrainers that can be done without major structural change.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

The restrainer -- is that the same sort of strapping program

that Caltrans did on the state system?
MR. AVILA:

I'll let Mr. Horii address that a little more specifically.
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We do have a

little better fine-tuned.

system, which I
Basically, it's based

on the age of structure, the span of the structure, the amount of daily traffic
carried.

That's basically the criteria that we're looking at.

construction that it is.

And the type of

We do have various types of construction.

If you look

at the North Broadway Bridge, which is an arch span versus the simple support
column-supported bridge.

All those factors are being put into the priority

system, and we're looking at that right now.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

How do you prioritize between single-column versus

multi-column?
MR. HORII:

We really don't have single-columns within the city; all ours

are multiple columns.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
priorities?

When was the last assessment done in the city for the

When was the last time they were inspected and a look was taken?

MR. HORII:

Ye have an on-going inspection program, where we inspect the

structures for structural stability, roadway surface, as a continuous process.

I

can't tell you which bridge was last looked at, but we do have a staff that does
this continuously year-round, looking at the structures.

I think we'll take

another hard look at it, saying, are they really up to seismic safety?

What

you're really looking for on the structural inspection is really whether there's
any deterioration, any cracks, or whatever, not just your superficial inspection,
which really doesn't get into the structure itself, looking at the structural
stability.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

How do you make the determination when you look at the

bridges and you say they've got to be retrofitted?

How do you determine that,

even though they need to be retrofitted, they're still safe enough to keep open?
MR. HORII:

Pardon me, I didn't understand the question.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You were mentioning that you've got 136 structures you've

identified that need to be retrofitted.
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have not said that.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So you believe

are safe to drive on?

We

MR. HORII:

I would say, in our estimation, yes, at this time, unless you

have a major seismic event.

Then we real

don't know what would happen at that

time.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Mr. Roos.

ASSEMBLYMAN MIKE ROOS:

Mr. Horii, what interested me in this debate that we

just finished with in Sacramento is, when Mr. Katz was in a meeting with Ms.
Waters, myself and others, trying to press Caltrans with respect to the insurance
of safety on some of this double-decking, there was a standard called maximum
credible earthquake, or an 8.3 episode.

That's what we were trying to nail down.

Is there a commonality in the engineering language with respect to what standard
you're seeking, and would you attest that the standard for the City of Los
Angeles is equal to the standard for the State of California and vice versa?
MR. HORII:

Ye have really not gotten to that stage of the analysis; and

based on the testimony Caltrans has been presenting to the City Council and so
forth, we really want to sit down with their experts and make sure our programs
are compatible.

They have a wealth of data that we did not have.

And we want to

work with them to capture that information and to examine our bridges based on
what they're projecting.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:

Yell, we all know this.

When we're trying to make better

public policy, we get a group of lawyers in the room, and on the number of
lawyers depends how many points of view and recommendations you come out with.
Does the same exist in the engineering community?

Are there legitimate

substantial differences in the evaluation of these structures with respect to
whether they're going to hold up under various magnitudes of a quake?
MR. HORII:

I don't think there's a difference there.

It's really

estimating what the magnitude of the quake is going to be and where the epicenter
will be and how that energy is transmitted to that location.
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awfully reminiscent of a Pinto report -- is the cost benefit correct in
developing the Pinto?

I don't think that you see any public lawmakers up here

who want to run for reelection saying

"Yell, it's an acceptable risk," meaning

that this freeway may collapse on you under the worst circumstances.
MR. HORII:

I'm not saying we will not des

we're going to design to

the best knowledge that we would have regarding what we think is necessary for
safety and so forth.
control.
know.

We would design for that criteria and not let the dollars

What I'm saying is there may be another event beyond that.

Ye don't

I cannot guarantee that that structure, even though I designed it for the

7.7 or the 7.9, that may not be the actual quake that occurs.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:

Where are you now?

Are you designing for -- what?

8.3?

7.9?
MR. HORII:

Ye would, I think,

now, go back to Caltrans and look at

data they have -- they've done the Harbor
Fault

based on the Inglewood/Newport

and take that data, and see whether that is the controlling seismic

event on our bridges, or do we look at the San Andreas break at the 8.3 as the
controlling point?

We have not gone into that extensive

at this time.

We've

done some preliminary work, based on what Caltrans has talked about,
strengthening columns.

That's where our estimates come from, just going ahead

and beefing up the columns.
work on that and say

Now, we may want to go back in and do additional

"Was our original pass at this an adequate assessment?"

And that's the reason, I think, we need to s
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structural repairs on them.
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I said, "No, we
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Katz asked

shut them down today because

or our concern about whether

major seismic event?

As

has had problems.

In the

s, stuff like that, superficial damage

on it, but not a structural damage so that we had to close the bridge for a gross
failure.

Talking about a structural failure,

'm

at the gross failure,

the bridge collapsing and not traversable to the
In response to several of the
questions that were asked, you
to study the issue.
information is.

that we have to go back, and we have

We have to talk

What I'd like

Caltrans

we need to know what the latest

know is how

of a time frame are we talking

about in which you will go back and you'll

it and get all the information

before actually we have an answer as to what the

is and actual work can

get started.
MR. HORII:

We'll start immediate

do not have staff to do all the work

on some
so we will s

possible with the staff that I do have.
capture.

I want to utilize that information.
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interview

contracts, it's a

select them
're

and negotiate

to the consultant

field, we're looking at next year, the start of the next fiscal year for us, to
have them on board.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD:

So it could be potentially six or seven months

before you'll even be able to have the consultants you need in order to get the
information?
MR. HORII:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD:
about seven months.

Just to get the consultants on board will take

So, potentially, we could be here a year, a year and a half,

from now and still not know what the problem is and have all the information.
MR. HORII:

Well, I'm not saying that.

program, we will need consultant help.

I'm saying that to do an entire

I do have some staff that can jump on

this thing immediately, and we can start analyzing the critical ones, starting
today or tomorrow or whatever.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD:

But it's going to be done sort of piecemeal as

you get a little bit of information, rather than taking care of it from an
overall plan and understanding of just what the problem is.
MR. HORII:

Yes, well, the data that you gather on what the problems are

is going to probably apply to every one of the structures.
structures may require a different type of solution.
information

Now, each of the

But we're gathering all the

how they should be analyzed, what are the forces going to be in any

given area, geological data, the best information we can get, and then look at
our structures, which ones are the critical ones for us to say, "Let's start a
program to strengthen that bridge if it's necessary."
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD:

But right now without the use of the

consultants that you say you need, you're doing that without the benefit ...
MR. HORII:

Part of that work will be done with available staff, yes.
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level, a level that will make you

comfortable, make us comfortable, so that when we go to the people of the city,
we can say with confidence that we're doing everything possible, everything
is seismically safe.

within our power, to make sure this c
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
question.

Mr. Wyman has one question, and then I have one last

Then we'll let you get on to your next meeting.

ASSEMBLYMAN PHILLIP D. WYMAN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't think it's

unnatural for a lot of people to be peppering you folks with questions, as is the
case with Caltrans as well.

I perceive, and I think the legislation that was

adopted, parts of some of that legislation that I and Mr. Katz were involved in,
perceives that local government needs technical support.
relates to structural analysis.

They need support as it

Caltrans has been specifically given an

additional part of $1 million to identify the latest state-of-the-art technology
from within the Caltrans lab, from throughout the universities, from throughout
the world so that, if there's any additional information that we need to model
our structures and to make them safe in the state system, that occurs.

But part

of that language in that legislation also says that that technc!ogy shall be
shared with the City of Los Angeles, with local governments, be it county or
city.

I think that reinforced our obligation as a state to share with local

communities so that you can get the best possible answers.
will be discussing that.
and it is stated.

I think that others

I think it's important that that commitment is stated,

It was signed in legislation by the Governor yesterday, and I

hope that will be helpful to you.
One final point.

The bench marks that you're using for the quake analysis

is the Sylmar and the Long Beach, and what was the third?
MR. HORII:

Whittier.

Now, those are not the bench marks.

historical, and they may not be our design standard.

-16-

Those are

s and
to

s

•

the

s

data

on
went into
the

•

to
"'r'<>rnPnr,

that

with a

that

you a

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Just one last question.

I appreciate your representation in

terms of what you're trying to give and the resources you are working with.
you were going to focus all of your efforts

If

on seismic upgrades, the seismic

safety, what would you be taking away from in order to make that happen?
MR. AVILA:
does.

We have critical problems in this city, as every large city

$150 million is a lot of money.

We've got to find new resources.

We can't take it away from anything.

There is no way in the world that we can

endanger the health and welfare of the people of the City of Los Angeles by
stopping our sewer program or stopping our other municipal facilities programs
that are critical to life in the city.
seismic safety.
shouldn't.

We must find a new way of financing for

The figures are enormous.

There is no way to substitute.

We

Granted, this is extremely important, and no one is going to argue

that, but we must find a way to deal with a problem that will recur.
have earthquakes through our lifetime and for generations to come.

We will
It seems to

me this is an ideal opportunity for all of us to get together and find a way to
provide some kind of reserve fund that is exclusively set aside for seismic
events, since we know that we can predict that they will occur.

It seems to me

that we, and the people of the State of California, would be willing to provide
some source of funding.

But I would be irresponsible to say I'm going to

redirect $150-200 million from other programs in the city.

It just would not be

feasible.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Thank you very much.

Bob, thank you also.

Next, we're

going to hear from Bob Best, Director of Caltrans.
I also want to mention, members, Assemblywoman La Follette left a statement
with the Committee.

She's chairing a Los Angeles Task Force on Better Education

and could not be here today, but wanted it entered in the record.
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has been one where every event teaches

s and progress from certain seismic events.

Certainly this state has undergone a dramatic change in past years in its
approach to roadway structures as a result of earlier earthquakes, and certainly
what we have learned from those has proven not to be enough in terms of what we
saw that occurred up in the Bay Area.

Ye're going to have to learn from that

event and move forward.
Ye know very well that the modern engineering tools that we have at our
disposal today can provide us with techniques to construct structures that can
resist virtually any type of force that can be expected.
one of the big

As Mr. Horii indicated,

is how to predict, with regard to an

lems we're fac

earthquake, what in fact does occur or will occur in order to try to go through

for that.

and construct the appropriate des

So as we step off in this program, we're going to be looking at the
prioritization that we have

in

programs where we had developed, on

a statewide basis, a retrofit program.

Ye have to look at that retrofit program

and decide whether or not what way it should be modified.
legislation that was s
are going to include

We now, under the

by the Governor, passed last week by the Legislature,
that local bridges and have to develop again a new

prioritization based upon what we learned and based upon the involvement now of
any local

s in this program,

11 as br

s on the state

system.
The Committee did present to us a number of questions in advance, and we
have provided a written response to those questions.
that in more detail.
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And then you have to move from that
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So we have a very, very

When we say crash program, that means we're
into it and moving on a much more

to be

program ahead of us.
to be pouring resources

basis than the retrofit program was
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set up in the past.

It also means that part of that crash program is going to be

an expedited investment in research to determine the knowledge we need in order
to begin to design the appropriate programs,
We're going to learn a lot from this quake in Northern California, and we're
going to see a lot of changes introduced into the way we approach seismic safety
in the state as a result of that.

In looking at the bridges that are in place,

we have conducted a review of the bridges down here to determine, based upon what
we could learn immediately from that quake in Northern California and the effects
that were received, do we have any bridges that we would be concerned about the
safety for the traveling public here in Southern California?
that has indicated, no.

Our first review of

In looking at that, we have no structures down here in

Southern California that are designed similar to the ones that collapsed in
Northern California.

That's one of the key factors, of course, in terms of

trying to determine what degree of confidence in safety we can have of the
structures that are down here.
One major structure that is under construction on the 110 -- we have called
in a peer review committee to take a look at the design for that, bringing people
in from the private sector and universities to work with an internal review team.
We will not start construction of that particular structure until that peer
review has been completed and has indicated that either the designs are safe,
from everything we know; or if they have indicated certain changes, we've been
able to incorporate the necessary changes in that.

So those are the kinds of

immediate reactions that are going on at the current time while we still have to
go ahead and learn some more from what the experience has been in Northern
California.
Would you like to move immediately to Mr. Roberts, Mr. Chairman, or do you
want to take a few questions now?
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Last Friday, I introduced a comprehensive multi-million dollar measure
before the City Council to ensure that Los Angeles City structures, the housing
projects, the bridges, the overpasses, and residential brick buildings meet
earthquake standards.

A piecemeal approach to bringing our city up to earthquake

safety standards doesn't make sense.

That's why we have to take a comprehensive

approach.
You listened to some of the testimony by Mr. Horii.

He talked about some of

the bridges that we have here in Los Angeles that do not meet seismic standards.
Whether we talk about public buildings -- and we have about 128 of them here in
Los Angeles that are unsafe out of the 187 city-owned buildings.

As far as

residential brick buildings, we have more than 23,000 residential units that
remain out of compliance.

The housing projects -- from information that we have

received, all of their structures meet city codes.

But much work remains to be

done as far as doing some of the work as it relates to the strapping of water
heaters and other non-critical issues.

The bridges

you heard that we have 416

city-owned bridges and overpasses, and over 100 bridges need some level of
reinforcement.
Along with the measure, we have included homeless shelters, of which we have
about 150 shelters in the City of Los Angeles that house approximately 6,000
people every night.

I am proposing that $10 million be set aside from the bond

proceeds for the expansion and rehabilitation of these shelters that would
increase our capacity by 5,000 people that could be served on top of those that
we serve today.
It seems to me that a lot of work has to be done in the coming weeks and
months so that the situation that we saw happen in San Francisco does not
reappear here in Los Angeles.

It seems to me that being proactive, as opposed to

being reactive, not only makes monetary sense, but certainly it makes sense from

-24-

in

that,

of

fair,

ral
obl

, the

s

as to how

much money would be needed to bring some of the overpasses, bridges, public
buildings up to code, we could put the general obligation bond measure back on
to support it and to see that it is passed.

the ballot with an

here in the city.

I think we have that capac

I think that whatever money we

invest today is going to be a small token of what we would have to invest if an
earthquake hits in the very same manner that San Francisco was.

I would hope

that we could learn something from that, so that the City of Los Angeles could
move in a proactive manner.
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS:

Richard, what kind of match, assuming that there is

some kind of match, do you think the City would be willing to do as it relates to
the State?
COUNCILMAN ALATORRE:
that's even possible.

About one for one wouldn't be bad.

I don't know if

The State has tremendous obligations, I'm sure, just to

take care of their own public buildings, as well as the roads, the freeways, and
the like, and the bridges that are state-owned.
problems.

Yes, we would like to see some relief.

remains to be seen.

I think, the State has some
Whether that's realistic

But in the meantime, it seems to me that we have an

obligation to move in a proactive manner, so that we can at least stabilize and
deal with whatever it is the City has responsibilities over, that we can minimize
the possibility of human loss.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Mike.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to note to the

Chairman and Mr. Areias how City Hall has obviously mellowed Mr. Alatorre.

I

remember the day when he would think an equitable formula would be two for one,
two state dollars for every one local.
COUNCILMAN ALATORRE:
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:

Well, I was really going to talk about five for one.

That's the Alatorre I'm used to working with.
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program was done

Yhen

we'll go to the next set of

bridges that were considered lesser risk, and so forth down the line.

is and

Again, with Monday

back on that, at that

particular period of time, there had been no real catastrophic failure in spite
of some major quakes.

been two lives lost.

There had

And even though we

to the fact that lives are lost every day

can't say just two lives, in

on the road system around the state, there was not a feeling that there was such
a threat to the structures in the state that it had to be carried off as a very
expeditious program.

We have now learned that there is a higher degree of threat

from the structures of the state than was expected at the time that program was
designed, but we don't know exactly yet the degree of that threat because we
aren't through with our learning.

also, we have to say that, with

In retro

regard to the identification of the

st priority risk, in setting up a

program to take care of that risk, it was indeed an accurate judgment.
We completed Phase 1 during the time that Phase 1 was under work; no
structures failed from that.

During the

or

we had up there, no

structure failed from the phase because of the inadequacy of the Phase 1 retrofit
program; and at the time the program was des

, nobody believed that there

would be the type of

column failure, even from a much larger

earthquake than was

So the program moved within government, given

its priority.

Ce

readdress that whole
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
with UCSD.

I think we're all in
of the

now that we need to

s for this program.

terms of the Phase 2, you indicated there's a contract

Also, there's an additional contract with UC Berkeley on multi-column

phases, but when I looked over the documents that go back in late 1987 after the
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the state

that were competing for the same dollars that the seismic program was.
To the best of my knowle

, there was no specific proposal put together

for additional resources for the seismic safety program that was denied in
the process.

But within a large institution, the institution itself goes through

a process of balancing what it's going to ask for, and the seismic program was
developed within the institution to be a long-range program and to be done on a
sequential phase basis rather than to be a short-range program with the phases
running parallel.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I have one last question.

To your knowledge, are there any

single-column structures in the Los Angeles area built pre-1971?
MR. BEST:

I have to refer to Jim on that.

He's nodding his head.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I assume there probably are.

Why don't we let him give you more details on that.

Okay, I'll come back to Jim on that.

Mr. Roos, then Mr.

Eaves, and then Mr. Areias.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:

Mr. Best, I wanted to get back to the questions I was

asking Mr. Horii in terms of the degree of certainty about your internal
evaluations and would they match up with an independent audit or an independent
analysis?

Would you attest that there would probably be no variance in what your

people conclude versus what an independent engineering firm would conclude?
MR. BEST:
the field.

I think the answer to your question is, yes, from what I know of

I've learned a lot about it in the last couple of weeks, being a

lawyer and not an engineer.

But when you get to the experts in the field, there

isn't a lot of what I would call independence in the sense that most of these
people have been working with each other for many, many years now, and that
includes on an international basis.

Any time there's been a major seismic event,

engineers from our department, engineers from foreign countries, engineers from
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There is

definitely going to be some degree of competition for resources.

At this stage,

we haven't really sorted that out, and there is a lot of concern that we not
abandon on-going projects for totally pursuing this particular process.

It is

our understanding right now that, if we can assume for a moment that the
independent resources are going to be there, in other words, that the policy
decisions with regard to resource allocation do not result in transferring
resources from other projects to this program, we will be able to keep both of
them on schedule providing, in addition to our own in-house expertise, there are
substantial contributions from the private engineering sector specifically on
this effort.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:

One final question.

Have you made a determination what's

going to happen to the Embarcadero Freeway yet?
MR. BEST:

No, we have not made that determination.

The Embarcadero Freeway

actually suffered from ...

(Due to loss of power to the recorder, the recording was interrupted at this
point in the hearing, resulting in the loss of a short period of testimony.)

... There were some initial standards going out.
high priority item.

This review will be a very

We have a lot of people on board looking at this from

various points of view, collecting information, taking samples, beginning to run
analyses.

As I said earlier, we intend to rig a portion that's going to be left

standing for the purpose of dynamic testing of the structure in place.

We're

talking about a matter of weeks of concentrated effort and then, of course, some
time to actually look at what that means.

We're not talking years here; we're

talking months in terms of being able to come up with a large percentage of the
knowledge.

Actually, I think, and I'm sure Jim would agree with this, in terms
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Do you have a date on that, Jim?

Ye expect to have it done

're

know

the end of the year.

Then the

construction can start.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Mr. Costa.
Yes, back to the

question.

when we concluded our work, we passed a number of

s of

Last weekend
lation that

dealt with both the acceleration of the seismic asse sment and retrofit program.
Ye also
federal funds.

for sales tax for additional means
The cost that this is

to

all the retrofit, do you have any handle

match the

reate in terms of dealing with

it seems to me it's going to be more

than we have provided for thus far.

•

MR. BEST:

Again, of course, the program that we're looking at now is not

only a state program, but also includes local structures as well.

You heard this

morning a kind of eye-ball guestimate for Los Angeles of $150 million.
looking at what we believe to be a minimum of a

00 million program at the state

level and probably higher than that to do the top
terms of actually giving a figure on this kind of a program
of a hard figure -- until you have

We're

bridges.
to

But, in
you any sort

completed your design and have a few

bids in, it's very hard to give actual dollar amounts.
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

And I don'

expect you to give me a hard figure, but I

think it's safe to say, at least from my pe
than the amount that we've

you thus far.

considerations is the

, that it's going to be larger
My que tion

at now in terms of

funds to do the job so that we can have

then, what
ing additional

safety in our transportation

system?
MR. BEST:

Ve're

at the federal level.

A lot in terms of the amount

of dollars we will need here at the state and local level depends upon the degree
of federal partie

ion, part

whether or not the federal government will

agree to include the program as part of the emergency relief program that they
have approved, like we have included it as
state level.

There's a

unce

of our emergency program at the

there as to where the federal government

will come down in terms of helping to support this particular program.

Beyond

that, if we have to come up with funding totally at the state level -- let me
clarify that.

It's clear that most of the work on the state highway system and

certainly a portion of the work on the local government system will be federally
eligible.

So the question is whether it is eligible under the special disaster

relief program or whether you have to include it in your on-going program and,
therefore, would offset other
on-going program.

That's the big question

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
obvious

here

questions at hand.

ects that might qualify for the regular
now.

Now you're getting to a concern that I have.

Ve're

to deal with the rehabilitation and the retrofit, the safety
The Chairman mentioned in his opening comment -- correct me

if I'm wrong-- that potentially the transportation package that we're going to
be asking the voters to approve next year might be a source of some additional
funding to deal with this problem.

Did you allude to that?
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3

in itself,

Would the

recommendation, Mr. Best, to the

Administration be prepared to make a

to whether or not, if sufficient funding is not

Legislature in

available from other sources, any money should be diverted from the
transportation package?
MR. BEST:

Ye would be in a position to make a policy recommendation, but I
we'll really have the numbers tied down very hard.

don't think by

we certainly will have better numbers than we're working with today.

But

Let me

emphasize that the transportation program that was going to be supported from the
SCA 1 measure was a ten-year program; and built into that program, at least on
the state highway system, was the continuation of the retrofit program that was
underway.

So some of the retrofitting dollars were envisioned to be part of that

program and were included within that program.

Now, from my understanding of the

discussions, I don't believe there was any determination made with regard to the
local share of that funding package, that any of that would be directed one way
or another.

But in terms of the basic ideas for the state program, at the time

that package was put together, it was expected that Phase 2 would be included
within that package and certainly at least the beginnings of Phase 3 as well.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Yill you be prepared in January to let this committee

know in what areas there was planned to be retrofitting and in fact that this
would dovetail?
MR. BEST:

Ye will give the Committee a

in January, or whatever

meeting you wish to schedule that for, Mr. Chairman, as to how we foresee the
retrofit program fitting in with the SCA 1 program.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

That would be very helpful.

conclusion of the Chairman's

s~atement,

retrofit needs that include not
they also mention bridges.

One last question.

In the

they talk about giving assessment to

local road, but rail transit as well.

And

In the area of rail transit, it seems to me that the
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•
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talked
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hold up as we

as -- at least

the one, Cypress, didn't hold up as we had anticipated.

, but frankly that damage was isolated to just a

Francisco did

We feel very strongly today that

constructions that were a mile

few

However, the 506 in San

the hinges first was the way to go, and we would

this prioritization of

recommend that today to the local agencies in their first review.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I don't think anybody is questioning the strapping program

as having been worthwhile.

I think some of us may wonder why it took 16 years to

The concern is that two years ago you were warning about potential for

do it.

single-column failure in pre-1971 structures.

There are a lot of pre-1971

single-column structures throughout the Los Angeles basin that all of us drive,
and I'm not getting a whole lot of reassurance that I want to drive home this
afternoon as opposed to walk.

MR. ROBERTS

I

think that, quite frankly, we've had to struggle within the

Department for this program versus other traffic safety programs.

I've been

the press of not pushing the program fast enough -- why I waited until

accused

1987 to write those letters -- at the same time, accused of possibly over-stating

the case to get the

million program.

after I wrote the letter.

That program was, in fact, approved

The California Transportation Commission voted to put

the funds into the program in December.
I wrote a letter on January 4, directing my people to get moving on the

des

and the

It did take a year to get that done.

with UC San
test

on the research for single-column retrofits.

haven't been

were
order to

three

Most of those

We did pursue designs for the projects

simultaneous with the research.
and

We've been working

The money was put in the 1988-89 fiscal year,

fiscal years at

at the end of that fiscal year.

million a year.

So the projects

I think the best I can say is, in

the program from a $4 million-a-year program to a
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program, we s

pass

word in the

sentence is "could .
But in
in the

at
four-level.

about the

I've written a

questions.

a lot of structures,

There are no

structures similar to the

Franc

about another week, we'll finish
northern area.

of

s

still value the

those
I

-columns, but

s in the

les area.

Ye did have

could have damage to some
because

program.

bent

90 percent, and you can

of held the bent

r.

000 feet,

it in the

, but the

s kind

compare that column

It's

of 40 years ago to

That

In

s first.

am confident

Even the Cypress struc

des

area.

review of the 1,500

Then we will concentrate on the Los

damage up there, so we have to
I

Ye

pre-1971 s

had some

oints at

columns.
bottoms of columns

and at the top in one
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
single-column.

I don'

think

the

questions are all focused around pre-1971 s

particularly in the Los

les area.

reservations in order to

columns,

Your reservations about them, which I'm a

little uncomfortable about, because you're
more

me you're

your

, which bothers me a lot.

you to tell me facts about whether
have to start

ss structure to

is safe or not,

at every memo I see from

said it's not safe and could use the

-47-

depend on

I don't want to

Roberts and say
he just

I

"Well, he

to hype funding

versus funding for blood alley on Highway 120 in the San Joaquin Valley?

How do

I make those determinations now?
MR. ROBERTS:

I think I understand your pas

sir, but seismic people

agree certainly over and over that, although we wrote this, they don't see the
structures today that they feel, from their analysis, are unsafe or should be
closed, that we haven't closed.

Yhat we want to do is get the Phase 2 program

completed so that we won't have the kind of damage that requires shoring them and
closing the road either above or below.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I guess then, just to bring it full circle on the Phase 2,

when you wrote the memo in October 1987, you said that you could advertise
contracts on July 1, 1988.
that point.

You didn't seem to think you needed more research at

You didn't seem to think there were any problems.

MR. ROBERTS:
was well underway.

The contract with the University of California at San Diego
They had done their theoretical work.

Towards the summer of

1988, they had begun building models, half-scale models for their testing, and
that testing is still going on.
have been completed on three.

There's a series of about six models.

Tests

I wrote a memo to my people to get the plans and

the details developed based on the research.

They did that.

The analysis is not

that simple because you're doing an analysis of a structure based on what it's
good for in the old codes and then adding to that what you can get from the
reinforcement.

Then the details to make it work have to be developed.

about eight projects completed in the fiscal year.
advertised.

We got

They're in line to be

As you know, the first two were approved by the California

Transportation Commission.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

They are here in the Los Angeles area.

You wrote the memo in October.

It went to the agency in

October: agency signed off on it in October-November, I guess.

Then you came

back again at the end of November with the cost-benefit considerations for Phase
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2.

the need for this

If everything
that.

curious as to what

it

MR. ROBERTS

MR. ROBERTS:

any program.

wouldn't think

I

asked for

I

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

that'

les.

what

there.

, the 110, the 710,

You

You talked about

fault and

Then you also talked about the San Jacinto fault in San
the sense sometimes in

I

out the

knew there was a
it, and folks weren't

some of this

you were

it as serious

there is a

here and stil

MR. ROBERTS:

s
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within

I have seven

number of designers that work on it.
are involved in des

And you could view the

to

You asked a question earlie

are involved in this program.

about the number of people that
ass

full-time and then a

's from a group of 1,000

, construction and maintenance.

program into conflict.

tuff that you

attention focused on

memo as an extra kick in the hindside

Also, the

that

So I think that puts the

for the first -- even up until this

earthquake, the first 80 years on the system, there were two fatalities.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
design, the maj

Yes,

hard to get the program

sir, we had to

Seven folks work in seismic out of 1,000
of which I would assume then des

doing

increased capacity and

new projects?
MR. ROBERTS:
safety features.

I

later.

It concerns me.

the 605, all in Los

Bernardino.

of

But after it's

CHAIRMAN KATZ

the potential.

that'

cost bene

any program to show

can't answer

I'm

memo?

And many

p

ects, as Mr. Best mentioned have some

But I think this is the only one where we have people
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specifically assigned for what's definitely a safety part of the program.

In

addition to the people we have, we've spent, since the San Fernando earthquake,
$2,600,000 at six different universities on various types of seismic research.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Any other questions?

Thank you, Mr. Roberts.

Let me get

Mr. Leonard up here since he has to get out of here.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN DELAINE EASTIN:
Sorry I came late.

Could I ask Mr. Roberts one quick question?

I wanted to know about your memo that you wrote and then you

said you exaggerated it, and now you're in the funny position of ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Delaine, we just went through this whole thing on this memo.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Was it an exaggeration or not?

Mr. Roberts said that he wrote the memo as an attempt to

draw attention and get funding.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

We just went through that whole thing.

The only point I'm trying to get at, Mr. Chair, is

what is the ethic in the Department that causes someone to feel in his own
testimony to the press that he's exaggerated a problem after the fact.

I need to

know whether you exaggerated the problem or didn't exaggerate the problem.
you felt you had to exaggerate the problem, that's a problem.

If

But if, in fact,

people had pressured you subsequent to that to say it was an exaggeration, then I
think that's a different problem.
MR. ROBERTS:

Which is it?

I think I need to repeat my statement that it's really not

possible to guarantee that there won't be fatalities at any time.

We sit here

and say what we know today about the bridges in this state; if they're unsafe,
they're closed.

As a result of the last earthquake, we closed all of the

double-deck viaducts in San Francisco.

But in this same earthquake, bridges that

were designed previous to 1972 and post-1972 performed well in the area of this
earthquake.

What we're trying to do on this program is reduce damage so that we

don't have to close up.

The system's not functioning in San Francisco on three
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can't be

major routes because of

until that damage is

repaired.
of the

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:
retrofit in California?

were the

If

next earthquake, have to look at a
MR. ROBERTS:

director of this state

in for seismic

amount of money would you

lose an Embarcadero.

-- we've estimated
You would say

what

, such that we wouldn't, the

ss or

The state

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

for seismic

500 million.

00-500 million: but sometimes your

estimates tend to be a little bit on the lean side, isn't that true?
MR. ROBERTS

're on the lean

ide in this area specifically because we

have excellent experience on the INS program
of good information to local agencies.
2.

and we can ce

Ye don'

have

at all on Phase

Ye have contracts about to be awarded.

really have no basis for es

some kind of bids in, we

ike you do

yes, it probably would be lean.

have

provide a lot

a normal

So I'd say,

in the

who think it's

much higher than that.

I

ASSEMBLYYOMAN EASTIN
CHAifu~N

KATZ:

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Leonard wants to make a brief

statement from the Chairman of the California Transportation Commission.
we'll go on with Dr. Pries
MR. WILLIAM LEONARD:

from the Univers

of California at San Diego.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

name is Bill Leonard.

I'm Vice Chairman of the California Transportation Commission.
have the opportunity to appear before the As
behalf of our chairman, Joe Duffel,
my testimony is repetitious.

I'm pleased to

Transportation Committee on

senting the CTC.

Mr. Chairman, much of

In the interest of the Committee's time and my

voice, I'm not going to repeat.
passed out to members.

Then

My remarks have been put in writing and will be

Let me make a few observations though.
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On October 17 at 5 04, our fellow Californians experienced a disaster.
event, which we have

This

dreaded throughout California, brought devastation to

one of the loveliest and most historic areas of our state, the San Francisco Bay
area.
In spite of the incredible destruction, there was much to give thanks for.
The immediate reaction of Caltrans, state and local officials, and our fellow
citizens in the Bay area, did much to mitigate the loss and suffering.

It is

well to bear in mind as we seek solutions to this terrible toll, an earthquake of
similar magnitude in Armenia last year caused the lives of 25,000 people.

The

Nimitz Freeway and the Bay Bridge failure was a terrible tragedy.

To keep this

tragedy in perspective, we have to be grateful that it wasn't even

J greater

tragedy.

And I give this as an accolade not only to Caltrans, but to make a

point.
Rehabilitation of the California highway and freeway system has been always
assigned the highest

for available funding.

are part of the rehabilitation program.

Seismic retrofit projects

As individual projects have been readied

by Caltrans for construction, the Commission, without exception, has allocated
construction funds so the contracts could be awarded.

In recent years of funding

shortages, it has been necessary to curtail new capacity projects in order to
assure that rehabilitation, including seismic retrofit, come
Let me make a personal observation, if I may.

first~

The San Franc

of October 17 is a catastrophe that will long be remembered.

earthquake

No one knows

precisely when or where the next earthquake will be centered, though we do know
with a high degree of certitude that there will be another.

One thing we do know

is that there will be frequent and continuing catastrophes that
impact the motoring public.
in Northern California.

It may be a fire; it may be a flood.

It may

b~

heavily
It usually is

slippage; it may be fog with the resultant
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-car accident.

multi-car pile-up, or even a s
to those involved.

The Commission

Whatever

ve

sensitive

we

Most every

when it's mandated, or it's the

getting federal funds for

committed to the necess

conclusion that, with limited transportation
we should attempt to

funds, choices must be made as to which future capac
In that event, it becomes

Hobson's choice.

d to

additional funding be
severely limited State

We

but

not

essential that

raise sufficient funds
to avoid future

shore up

failures and to provide congestion relief and acce

rate our seismic retrofit

Caltrans and the Commission are out of money to meet the transportation

needs of the rich state and very

economy.
, San Bernardino.

Today is election day in my

proposed one-half cent sales tax increase.
increase in sales tax

In

I sent to each of the

Two sentences in my letter are

hearing today:
nation.

It

reimburse emergency expenditures from the

Account.

to repair the

editor.

of assuring a

above other assessments in the system.

over

One can lead to the ine

•

people

system, that its maintenance and repair is

adequately funded, as a

•

of

ects that meet the criteria of

The Commission is

safe, reliable

program.

to save

ects, such as sound

attenuation walls or

negate.

these concerns.
ect des

lives and protect prope

and property.

it certainly is a

(2)

(1)

On the ballot is a

of the adoption of this
newspapers a letter to the
germane for this committee's

California has one of the lowest gas tax rates in the

While inflation has driven the cost of

ion projects

skyward, because they bought efficient cars, the cost to the motorist has
materially dropped.

Measured in terms of today's dollars, California drivers

paid $183 in annual gas tax in 1964

compared to the average annual tax in 1987
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of $58.

In 1964, California was rated as having the best transportation system

in the United States.

In 1989, we cannot keep up with the repair, maintenance,

rehabilitation, plus new capacity, with 30-cent dollars.
If I may expand just a little bit on one of the questions that was
propounded to Director Bob Best, were you to take all of our transportation
dollars and categorize them into one of three categories, they would become
either (1) engineering support, planning, administration and operations, or (2)
maintenance and rehabilitation, or (3) capital outlay.

As we reported to the

Legislature in our annual report of January 1988, maintenance and rehabilitation
projects have increased 600%, from $489 million during 1966-70 to $3.4 billion
expected during the 1986-90 period.
between 1966-70 was 9%.

Thereby, overall transportation budgets

This has grown to 21% for the recent 1981-85 period and

will continue to grow to 32% of expenditures between 1986-90.

Despite recent

year increases in highway capital outlay expenditures, capital outlay will have
decreased as much as 77%, adjusted for inflation, between 1966 and 1990.

The

increasing maintenance burden, combined with little real growth and
transportation expenditures, has left less capital outlay money to expand highway
capacity in new areas of rapid growth and to serve real economic growth in
California's long-established major urban areas.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very kindly for the opportunity to appear before
you.

If there are questions, I shall attempt to answer.

Bob Remen

our

executive, is with me and might be able to field them.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Thank you very much, Mr. Leonard.

You touched upon a

comment in terms of the expenditures that dealt with a question that I had asked
Mr. Best earlier.
MR. LEONARD:

Has the Commission met since the earthquake?
Ye met the day after, sir, yes.
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

The reason that I ask that is, I'm

considerations the

of
of

a host

s

upon the

ects

year by the voters.

what sort

be

It's clear, based upon the comments Mr. Best made in
, the

response to my question, that the cost of the
thus far.

to exceed what we

rehabilitation is

dollars we're going to receive remains to be seen.
have enough money as it is.
this point.

passed next

In essence

As you indicated, we don't

we almost don't have

What recommendations are you

Administration and to the

How much of federal

to be

money at
to the

lature for additional

espec

of these monies are taken out of SCA 1 to deal with the

if some

questions at hand

today?
MR. LEONARD:

Well, Mr. Chairman

number one, is very st
collectively.

and active

Number two, we

SCA 1, both individually and

he doesn'

; and

It will be some little while

before the Department does have a handle.

However

us at the earliest possible time, poss

the November meeting, a proposal for

acceleration of the

•

that the Commission,

, don't have a handle on the

from Director Best's comments

•

let me

2 retrofit programs and a proposal for the solving

of those bridges and structures that came in
category for us.

we have asked them to provide

3 was a new

3•

Ye were not aware of that until October 18.

be a great deal of room for the

There's going to

sector to attack those problems.

Director Best made reference to that.

I think a

going to come from the private sector

because the job at this point is

many of our solutions are

overwhelming.
Where are the additional funds going to come from?

This Committee was

certainly very beneficial and instrumental in getting federal funds in large sums
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available to California, much larger than the law would ordinarily provide had
you not had the law changed.

That's going to be very, very helpful.

extra quarter of a cent that's going to be very, very helpful.
fund is going to be very, very helpful.
opinion.

There's the

The rainy-day

And here I have to get into a personal

Add them all up, they're not enough.

allowed our infrastructure to go downhill.

They are just not enough.

We've

I picked the year of '64 because that

was a year we could look back on when California was proud of its infrastructure.
We have not put enough of our resources there.

Now, that opens up the question

for the Legislature to determine whether that means that there should be a
curtailment of existing programs, whether there should be additional revenue
introduced in the program, or whether it should be accomplished by both.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Well, ultimately, it is both our responsibility and the

Administration's; and since this will probably carry over to the next
Administration, we'll hope, whoever they are, they'll be prepared to make some
recommendations.

But will the Commission, in your opinion, be also prepared to

make recommendations as a commission.
over a ten-year basis.

You have $18.5 billion worth of priorities

A lot of those projects have already tentatively been

approved, are there awaiting those funds.

Will you have to make any decisions in

terms of prioritization if a billion dollars-plus is taken from that total sum of
money for the purpose of retrofit for safety reasons?
MR. LEONARD:
the pig story.

Mr. Chairman, I'm not going to bore you with the chicken and

But I'm here with a fever because I want you to know that this

commissioner is firmly committed to working with the Legislature in any way we
can, and we will put our money where our mouth is.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. LEONARD:

We appreciate that.

Thank you, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

I have a question by Ms. Eastin.
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Yes,

ASSEMLYWOMAN EASTIN:
s

the
ne

'

you share in

and

know

:rms of

of the question:

bottom
we

What

You

ust said

that the CTC was not

s

afte

program until the

•

you and

3 retrofit

the

I had not heard

MR. LEONARD

, which was the

the

after

That's correct.

ASSEMLYWOMAN EASTIN

And you also

that Mr. Roberts, the bridge

, had

structures chief at Calt

was some serious threat to

life if certain other retrofit
I

And

not in any

therefore, the Nimitz

MR. LEONARD:

of our

Is

was not

aware

?

Whethe

should be -- I

don't know the date of
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN
million

to you a

for retrofit in California

did submit to us a
2 of

been let.

million

. Eastin
of

1

4 million

which has been

if I

which was

funded

but

say that they
funded, a
. 2 million has

And that's understandable because of the lead time necessary to

ects going.

I would make

observation just from my own seeking of

lieve

information since the
closer to $200-250 million.
Department, but as
that their retrofitt
be.

00-500

did

The answer is "no

MR. LEONARD:

the

And at

I say that

their
more

million
in the sense

ect

ive than

back

I think

to be much
the
're finding
believed it would

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

Have you ever seen anything at Caltrans that wasn't?

I'm not trying to make wrong here.

What I am trying to do is say that, in the

past, I'm not sure any of us have asked the right questions.
incumbent on all of us to ask the right questions now.

But I think it's

We've had a terrible

reminder of just how far behind our infrastructure needs are.

While it's been

sexy to go after the new construction, the new capacity projects and not so
glamorous to go after the retrofit projects, it seems to me that ought to become
a priority in California and that we ought to move as quickly as possible to fund
that and to do so also with a sense of urgency.

Clearly, by the fact that you've

let $1.2 million, the fact that CTC was told that they could be advertising
contracts as early as July 1, 1988, and here it is November 1989, it seems to me
there isn't a sense of urgency.

This has not been a high-priority project and

really needs to be moved up in terms of the sense of urgency for all of
California.
MR. LEONARD:
conclusion.

Ms. Eastin, in all due respect, don't draw an erroneous

Looking at the chart, from '76 through '90, maintenance is pretty

well leveled out, no change.

Rehabilitation, which would include seismic

retrofit, has actually increased for the last five-year cycle, '86-'90.

The

price of holding maintenance level and increasing rehabilitation has been by
decreasing capital outlay almost $3 million.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

While I agree that we're spending a lot more money on

rehabilitation than we historically did, I would still suggest that the Cypress
~

points out, since it wasn't even on anyone's plate to do in the immediate future
in terms of the kind of retrofit we would have needed, it seems to me that we do
need to have a greater sense of urgency, more fire in our belly, if you will,
about this issue, which has up to now not been a very interesting subject for a
lot of people.
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MR. LEONARD

I

can't quarre

the Commission

it 100%.

I feel certain

pos

ASSEMBLYWOMAN

the historic

south

use

reconstruction.

think

Do

how our resource

use

should be

as deciding

spec

where issue

ic safety are

concerned?
MR. LEONARD:
wrestle with.
I

Ms.

From

tin

for myself,

what's needed or rehabilitate what's needed worst.

drive all of

doesn't real

that you folks have to

a

very technical

would like to

pe

that'

turn me

I

of California, so
But I unde

tand the

That's an

issue for you folks to wre tle with.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN
on

The las

a
lete

shame to see that

ect have to go

that we see in the

STIP

the CTC is
that are
It would be a

s

the normal e
ect.

I would

that would ensure, not jus

such catac

that

item the

out of commission

a policy

would ask

for the

period

that the CTC would
ss, but for any other

event in the future, that the total reconstruction would receive

priority under state
MR. LEONARD:
whatsoever, would

I understand what you're
that and

feel very comfortable that the entire

Commission would support that position,
Fortunate

, he wasn't on the

and I, with no hes

its chairman, Joe Duffel,
As a matter of fact, at the time

were two commissioners that were

there

close to creating vacancies on our
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commission because of that catastrophe.
with the commissioners.

I can assure you it will move forward with dispatch.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Thank you very much, Mr. Leonard.

Thank you, Mr. Leonard.

we will take the next witness.
San Diego.

It's a very sensitive, personal subject

Hearing no further questions,

Dr. Nigel Priestly, University of California from

Dr. Priestly must have left.

We have Dr. David Rogers with

Rogers/Pacific, Inc. of Pleasant Hill.
DR. J. DAVID ROGERS:

Mr. Chairman, I had originally intended to show

slides.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

That would be rather difficult, I think.

Why don't you

try to be very visual in your description.
DR. ROGERS:

Everything that I have to say is in the testimony outline.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
DR. ROGERS:

Please sum it up, give us a briefing.

Basically, I worked on preparing a dynamic analysis proposal on

the structure while I was in graduate school at the University of California at
Berkeley.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
DR. ROGERS:

On the Cypress structure -- 1977 and 1978.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
DR. ROGERS:

On which structure?

This was a class project?

No, this was an individual research project with Professor

Jerome M. Raphael, the reinforced concrete expert.

At that time, we identified a

number of possible modes of failure of the structure.

I've summarized those in

my notes.
We were frustrated, at the time, with the paucity of data, especially
structural site response spectra data from earthquakes.

Basically, all we were

using at that time was the 1940 El Centro quake and the new records that were
developed from the Sylmar quake of 1971.
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We did not have the kind of data,

motion instrumentation data,
in the

s we

need
Area.

variation in the

a great

And indeed, when

s of

downtown Oakland, about four times what we
distance from

use for the types of

That was

quake hit
levels we

we see
in

in San Francisco, the same
to worry about ten years ago, and I

think we're worrying about it now.
There are members of the Seismic

Commission, espec

Allen and Bruce Bolt, who question us
You start there, but it isn't

the maximum credible earthquake method.

to tell you what level of

structural response you're

to have in any one

That's

research

years.

At the time I

the

between $40,000 and around
The results of one

you can see in there a cost of
on how many

,000

birth to the necess

going to the next

•

and

icular area.

going to take another generation of
over the next ten or

Drs. Clarence

At that time

s we had to do.

or the non-necessity of

we learned there was no money set aside

for the analysis of multi-column

structures, even

structures at that time were being analyzed

other major

the Department, such as the Bay

Bridge and the Golden Gate Bridge,
I've also put in the notes the observations about the earthquake, what we
knew about the earthquake.

The earthquake was not unexpected.

powerful earthquake we were to have in the Bay Area.

It had five times more

probability than any other earthquake, and the area was
reports

That was the most

identified in

under the direction of the Seismic Safety Commission, or at

their request, in 1984.

I've referenced that in division 2.

I've also put there

a description of the styles and modes of failure seen on the site, a number of
scaled engineer drawings.

There's 19 figures in the back of the notes, and you
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could refer to that for further information.
your time.

I'll defer from taking any more of

I'll be glad to answer any questions.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Thank you.

Yhy do you think the Embarcadero Freeway,

that is a multi-tier structure, appears to have withstood the affects of the
quake in better condition than the Nimitz did?
DR. ROGERS:
figure 2.

There's two figures I would refer you to in the back, figure 1,

Figure 1 is from our original 1978 proposal.

It shows that the

Cypress was a very long, linear structure, probably about 6,800 feet long.
very straight shot.

It's

In straight structures, you can get earthquake waves, shown

on the bottom of the figure, reverberating up the structure; and you have a
different kind of structural response coming back through the structure so the
waves can synchronize.

If the waves become synchronous, you can get even much

higher levels of vertical motion pounding up and down, which was not even
appreciated until after the San Fernando earthquake in 1971.
appreciated, period.

We were very frustrated.

It was not

I spent about nine months trying

to find vertical records, because we were worried about this mode of failure.
You can see on the second deck in on that figure 1, we've drawn a circle around
the bottom of the upper supporting columns.

That was the area we were worried

about in vertical shaking.
On figure 2, on the next page, you see the answer to your other question
about the Embarcadero Freeway, the central freeway, the 280.
are curved and they have a lot of ramp appendages.

Those structures

Yhen you do that, you have

some natural defense towards having these synchronous dynamic responses, because
the earthquake energy wave is hitting the structure at a different point on the
structure at any one time, so the waves don't ride up with each other and get
reflecting with each other.
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Last

, we look at

the most

7

one.

strong motion instrumentation results, a program that was
the California

Motion

quake.

can see the

In there

horizontal accelerations.

trumentation

You

though it's the same

vectors.

se are the maximum

see that Oakland bas

hammered with

This

, the same

the fact that even
r, the same distance from

response, the loads

epicenter, the

talled in the state,

after the 1971

are we

respect to what level San Francisco

These are

structures, are

to be

very, very different, a five-fold difference across the same area here.

So it

depends what kind of geology you build your structure on and what the geometry of
your structure is as to how it performs.
ASSEMBLYVOMAN EASTIN:
say the

Dr.

policy

but general

you were s
for California are

, what would you
not

us

If you were tomorrow elected to the State

at the Cypress
lature, what would

you do to ensure we don't ever have to talk about another failure like this.
DR. ROGERS:

•

rain records.

Well

We

we're

to

other failure

It's like having

have one record; it shows up about every ten years .

time we have one of those

we learn a lot.

Vhat we've learned in Mexico City and

in this earthquake is that you have to look at each site
other generation of earthquake

A whole

research needs to be embarked upon

that really looks at these
effects.

Every

effects, what we call

enhancement

That's very much going to be a concern of Los Angeles when you have a

large earthquake because Los

s

a

earthquake waves are going to reverberate
basin, and they're going to keel
Torrance, that area.

over in

Pleistocene

basin.

And those

the softer sediments of the
Hills,

Hills,

Actually, even though you're further away from the quake,

those waves are going to reverberate down like they're in a big bathtub.
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This is what happened in Mexico City in 1985, and it validated that group of
people who had postulated this effect for a long time, the ground enhancement
effect.

That quake was 200 miles away, and it leveled every masonry structure

14-21 stories high.
So there's a type of structure that's going to be vulnerable, and there's a
type of geological area that's going to be vulnerable.

And just saying, "I'm

this far from the quake; the maximum quake might be an 8.3," isn't going to be
enough to prevent a large number of failures and collapses.
too smug in proximity.
not going to get hurt."

I think we've been

You say, "Well, I don't live on the San Andreas, so I'm
This epicenter is down there in Watsonville, and it

wipes out a freeway structure 100 kilometers away.

It's the structure and the

geology.

We really need to fund that and take it seriously.
funding died when I was in graduate school.
hazardous waste in the 1980's.

Earthquake engineering

It just stopped, and we started

So I think every time you have a major quake,

there's going to be new lessons.

We don't have enough of them records-wise.

first strong motion data we ever had was El Centro in 1940.

The

The second really

was San Fernando because Park Field and Tehachapi were out in remote areas, and
we didn't have accelographs in those areas to give us engineering data.
seismograph data doesn't help the design engineer.
that just measures energy release.

See, the

As Mr. Roberts pointed out,

That's how we get a magnitude.

Those

magnitudes don't have a lot to do with what gets knocked down and what doesn't
get knocked down.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

Would you be available to assist the Legislature in

understanding how we should develop funding for that type of research?
DR. ROGERS:

Sure, I'd be glad to, and I'm sure there's lots of other people

even more well qualified than I am, people like Dr. Hausen or Dr. Jennings.
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

As I understand from your te
in fact had a

the radio in San Francisco that
ss, which was not funded
DR. ROGERS:

I

s

overheard on

for the

California.

the State

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

And you were not terribly surprised, as I understand

it, that the Cypress went down.
DR. ROGERS:

•

I was surprised at the amount of Cypress that went down.

We

were worried about especially bents 105 to 111 in the north end, and that's where
the greatest damage was.

That's the only section that went completely down.

The

rest of the failure was a partial

, just the

bottom deck.

two bents, 105 and 106, did the entire

The bottom deck held.

structure go down as are evidence of

deck going onto the

or foundation failure.

caps

That's what we were worried about in the '70's.

The technology was there in the
is.

'70's, but the funding wasn't, to do the

I think it's great that

Caltrans is going to the consulting engineering community and getting that kind
of help because I think we could real
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

each other out.

So you would suggest there are other structures in

California, based on what we know today, that are at least of concern to you as a
professional?

•

DR. ROGERS:
out.

Yes, very much so.

This data, this quake, really points this

You're going to have to look at each area, a site-specific point of view,

and spend a lot more time and money looking at the geology under that structure.
If you look at figure 7, it will give you a real graphic representation.

There's

two stations not even a half mile from each other, Treasure Island and Yerba
Buena.

Treasure Island is part of Yerba Buena.

It's a man-made fill, sand, done

with hydraulic fill.

You see one gets .06g; the other one gets .16g, almost

three times as much.

There is a proximity to the fault.
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We have to reevaluate ground motion and ground enhancement effects, look at
the sites with a lot more sophistication.
records.

That's going to happen with more

This is going to be the most well-instrumented quake in United States

history -- over 400 strong motion instruments in the net within 200 kilometers of
the quake.

And if Los Angeles ever has one, it's going to be even greater

because they passed ordinances back in 1965 requiring three accelographs in every
building over ten stories high.

So Los Angeles is the most well-instrumented

site, probably, in the United States if the not the world.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Tokyo might be close.

There's been some talk at one point about a kind of rat-tail

affect at the end of an earthquake area.

That's not the scientific term; that's

what we used to call it in locker rooms when folks with towels would snap them.
Is that valid?

Is that just talk, or does something like that occur at the end

of a seismic area?
DR. ROGERS:

There are some new theories that were expounded upon about

three or four years ago by a seismologist named Dr. Robert Naylor, who lives in
that waves are

San Francisco -- he used to be with the U.S. Geological Survey

reflected down, go along the bottom of the crust, then come up to create damage
zones 200 miles away.
There's a lot we still don't know.
It was 12 miles down.

This type of quake was very different.

It was almost all vertical, 70 degree inclination with the

Santa Cruz block going up.

Beaches are going to rise toward the Santa Cruz side.

And it petered out about four kilometers below the surface.

So like the Whittier

quake, it didn't even come up and break through the surface.

What we have on the

surface is just bridge spreading fractures due to the bridge being reverberated
so much.

We don't have a clean fault break like we had in 1906.

It was a really

different style of motion, but very well predicted with regard to what portion of
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the fault was going to go and how soon.

That was the

event in

that section of that fault.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So to some extent you can

what

s of faults are

most likely to have events, and then also the kind of event as well?
this is an unusual event since it was so deep.
fault and made that kind of a j

You said

If someone had looked at this

that there was

to be an activity, is

there a likelihood they would have come up with this, but it wouldn't have been
12 miles deep and it wouldn't have looked like a vertical movement?

DR. ROGERS:

The

u.s.

has had good survey creep nets on

San Andreas, starting around Hollister and
large quake at Park Field in 1967.
had expected a quake.

down to Park Field.

They've had a real

I can't

There was a

net down there.

They

for them about what style of movement they

expected, but we have a section of the fault that's moving and creeping.

And

this section that moved was called a locked section, a section that wasn't
exhibiting movement so that strain built up because there was movement south of
it and there was movement north of it.

Yhat

what window the quake is going to occur in.

can't do is tell you exactly
I've studied these things for years,

and I got pretty excited after about 20 seconds of shaking because I was resolved
to die and never experience a large quake.
things just don't happen that often.

That was a good probability.

These

So the awareness isn't there until after

the catastrophe happens.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
comes.

You don't mind if most of us hope that your big moment never

You might be disappointed; we'd all be very relieved.

DR. ROGERS:

It'll come in L. A.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

But, as you say, geological windows being what they are,

they're a little broader than windows that we're normally used to that term
implying.
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DR. ROGERS:

Yes, we're just starting, even in the last ten

understand seismology more.
the Midwest, we know now.

The largest fault in the United States runs between
The largest quake in U.S. history was epicentered in

New Madrid, Missouri in 1810.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

to really

There are large quakes that are going to occur in

Charleston and Yellowstone.

on the San Andreas system.

ye~rs

But those don't happen nearly as often as things

It's a very active system.

If you were sitting where we were in terms of looking at

freeways in Los Angeles, what would your thoughts be?

Do you think freeways in

Los Angeles are safe?
DR. ROGERS:

Freeways or bridges?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
DR. ROGERS:
before 1930.

Bridges.

You have to take a real hard look at bridges built, especially,

I was surprised to hear L.A. had so many of those.

Just because it

went through the 1933 quake at Newport/Inglewood -- that was sixteen miles off
the coast.

If the Newport/Inglewood moved closer to Baldwin Hills, you might not

fare as well.
You have to remember the Cypress structure, when we were

study~ng

through a very sizable earthquake right when it was being built.
concrete and the last section had just been poured.

stronger with age.

The last

On March 22, 1957, we had a

5.3 event, epicentered only 13 1/2 miles away, very close in.
probably .lg, more than it was designed for.

it, went

The structure got

The concrete was wet; concrete gets

The structure did fine.

You can get a false sense of security because you went through this quake or
went through that quake.

No two quakes are the same.

You've got to look at

every single structure, every single system with that kind of individual eye; and
the maximum credible quake might not be the quake that knocks you down.
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, Clarence Allen and Bruce
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for years.
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level of

specific

because I find this or that in

sn't mean it's

the San Fernando Val

tication

work out at the 7

in Pomona.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

That, I assume also, is the reason you use a maximum

credible

to

standard, as oppo

7.0 statewide or 8.0

statewide.
DR. ROGERS:
particular area

event ever

MCE says what's
but that'

shock load.

just

mean that the structure

neces

there, s

Again, duration gets

for that

out

to

It doesn't

that one load.

of motion, up and down versus s

like that.
CHAIRMAN KATZ
instructions do we

As

Caltrans to build
, when

credible

was a new fault.

understand

turns

, build for the maximum

that it's

assume that the maximum credible

DR. ROGERS:

San Fernando,

that were

new fault?

some

and no one knew the fault line was there.

and Whittle
some of which

to

to be 4 or 5,

Narrows were all faults
even break ground surface.
to be amazed as a geologist.

to find out that 90% of the faults don'

say there's 112-120 active faults in California.
faults in California, most

was

You're

What do you do about that?

If you go into an oil company'
You're

What

break the surface.

That's about 10% of the active

The maximum credible event

say, will a large event close in on the

So we

what it does is

load my structure worse

than a far away event on the Garlock or the San Andreas?

You look at those

things, and you decide which one's going to put a greater load, a longer load.
And the maximum event might be the San Andreas one.

Most of L.A., it is, even

though it's not as close to other faults, like the Raymond fault, Pasadena, and
the Newport/Inglewood.

So the MCE is the term to say, of all these faults we can

choose from, we're going to choose a big event and hope that designing for that
will hold us up in the smaller unforeseen ones like Whittier Narrows.
ASSEMBLYMAN EAVES:

I think I want to get back to what you said that

Caltrans' program was in the right direction and they needed to do this
site-specific; but realistically, if there's 7,000 bridges in Caltrans' system
and x-amount wherever, what are we talking about if we're going to look at each
one of those individually in the way of dollars?

Again, it's this thing that you

can design bridges with zero risk if you can afford to do that.

When you're

starting to retrofit 7,000 bridges, you can't just say, "Here's the standard.
We're going to build bridges statewide."

What you're saying is you have to do

that; and in addition to that, then you have to specifically design them for the
location they're at, based on all these varying factors.

Could you give me some

idea whether it's realistic to think that we can in fact look at all of these
bridges, site-specific, or is that something that would be nice if we had
unlimited funds?
DR. ROGERS:

Following the 1971 Sylmar quake, Caltrans contracted with the

Division of Mines and Geology to produce a statewide map showing what the maximum
base rock accelerations would be.
two years ago.

That's out now.

They contracted for another more detailed map
They map in zones.

So the maximum credible

bedrock acceleration might be .5g in a whole zone belt through the San Fernando
Valley, say.

Then they have to take that data and look at the geologic column

and see will that bedrock acceleration be amplified in this location or will it

-70-

see

in this

be

lot of

and

figures
t acceleration

in the

ral hundred

which

with the
same

factors

are realistic,

If you

section of what we knew

about

•

were .5g

bedrock
was

The

.28g.

re and

credible

so that would

us

that

hadn'

to

ture
CHAIRMAN

lived in the

informative.

area.

an
area

ove

because

We experienced
ses

that

that

?

DR. ROGERS

•

ASSEMBLYWOMAN
Santa Ros

Santa

r

ASSEMBLYWOMAN HANSEN
quake

, but

is co

was

DR. ROGERS

I

San

maps

were

know and knew
we'

in front of us,

g's

idea where the st
DR. ROGERS:
distribution.

to

s

accurate?

idea
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, we look

the MCE event

It was a

This map

Did we have a good

to be?

We

event, of Cypress.

No.

was it

the numbers?

to this

.5 on the

this kind of
the maximum credible
four miles away.

If

you design for that, that's so overwhelming that something from 100 kilometers
away actually is less than that.

No, we can't predict exactly how the ground is

going to shake in any one area, so we have to pick a big number and see if we can
work with that.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HANSEN:

You talked about the problem with bridges and

structures built before the 1930's.

If you took another date that would be

dangerous, going from 1930, where would you place that one?
DR. ROGERS:

1973.

Anything before 1973 were using the El Centro records.

That's what the designers for Cypress used.
college.

That's what we used when I was in

That was the only good site response spectra we had because it was the

first site that had an accelograph on it.

The accelograph was born at Cal Tech

right about that time, in the late '30's.

The seismograph was invented in the

mid-1930's by Richter.

The first seismograph record we have is the 1933

earthquake in Long Beach.
Centro.

The first accelograph data we have is 1940 at El

At the other quakes I have mentioned, like Tehachapi, which was a 7.6 in

July 1952, we didn't have any strong motion instruments up in that area; and two
major railroads, Santa Fe and Southern Pacific, got leveled in that quake.

They

were out of commission for weeks.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HANSEN:

The information that we get from this quake -- is it

going to be very helpful in building the next level of technology and the maps
that we need to draw from this point forward?
DR. ROGERS:

You bet, because we did get at least a San Andreas event.

wasn't a major San Andreas event.
instruments.
to the quake.

It

It was only a moderate one, and we have 400

In 1940, we had three.

We have 400 instruments that are close in

It's going to give us a lot more data to work with and synthesize

from loading the structure to the style of loading.
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have very

probabilities of having a major quake in the next half century.
they do.

We'll see how

They've put a lot more money into it, and they've had a lot more deaths

than we've ever had.

We've been extremely lucky, in '71, Sylmar, and this last

quake, when you look at how many people were on the highways and the Norman
Reservoir was only less than two feet from breaking.
more deaths.

Ve could have had a lot

Someone is watching over us up there.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Good, thank you very much.

Before I bring up Dr. Iwan, I'd like to ask Councilman Holden to come
forward.

He's the chairman of transportation.

COUNCILMAN NAT HOLDEN:
you're holding this hearing.

Thank you very much, Mr. Katz.

I'm very glad that

I just want to share with you just briefly

information that I was able acquire about two weeks ago when I had a hearing on
the very same subject as it relates to I-105, the Harbor Freeway.

The community

felt that this construction going on right now was going to be double-decked, but
it was not going to be double-decked.

It was going to be an elevated freeway.

They wanted to know whether or not it would be safe and would withstand the
highest magnitude of an earthquake in this general area.
Ve had come back to discuss this subject matter with us, Mr. Sammy Newel,
who is the chief of the Office of Structural Design, Mr. James Gates, who is the
Structural Mechanical Engineer in the Seismic Analysis Division, Caltrans, and
Mr. C. J. O'Connell, the Deputy District Director of I-105 Project Management.
Ve learned quite a bit.

In fact, I think people who were in the room and

heard the testimony -- their confidence level was raised.

For example, we talked

about the fact that the columns that are going to be elevated on I-105 will go 70
feet into the ground.

The I-105 is being separated, has been expanded on each

side, building a new lane on each side, which would maintain the same traffic
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flow that we have

now, which you're all familiar with.

It's designed for a

g-force of about .5 at the base.
We talked about what maximum
freeway could stand.

The

us the most g-force
Fault.

would come from the

•
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site specific, which you

area; and it is des
today.
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say, however, that
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put

tandards and des

back after their
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viewing of

will share that information with us.

went on to say

on the

elevations that were

in 1971, phase 1 retrofit is

has to be done, which is another

us

I might

Phase 2 yet

a sleeve in order to increase

the safety factor.
The problem is that the money is not available to do all of this work
simultaneously, so we're going to be
Legislature to put up

on you and the other members of the

money so they can do their job completely.

What

they need for us to do at the local level is to allow them to close down some
streets in order to take care of the
do.

That which we can do we will

Ye made that commitment to Caltrans.

But what we will need is the money.

I'm satisfied with the elevation that we have going down I-105.
it's going to be OK.

They think it's going to be OK.
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I think

Based on the information

given by the members of the committee, we will await with anticipation the report
from the experts.

The Caltrans team have strong reason to believe, however, that

their design criteria will be validated by this new blue ribbon commission.
That's where we stand; I just wanted to share that information with you.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Councilman, I appreciate it, and we will work with you.

you know, the Governor signed the $320 million yesterday.

That's a start.

As
We

will work closely with you and try to come up with the rest of what's needed for
the city and work out a way to do that.

Thank you very much.

I'd like to call Dr. Bill Iwan, who is a member of the Seismic Safety
Commission.

I appreciate your hanging in with us.

After Dr. Iwan, we have Mr.

Noyes from the County of Los Angeles to give a county perspective.
DR. WILFRED IYAN:

Thank you, Chairman Katz and committee members, for

giving me the opportunity to address the Committee on behalf of the Seismic
Safety Commission.

My name is Wilfred Iwan.

I'm also a faculty member at Cal Tech.
remarks.

I'm a member of the Commission.

I'd like to give you some prepared

I'll try to abbreviate them due to the lateness of the hour and just

make the main points of what we wanted to say.
Each strong motion earthquake that we experience is a full-scale real live
test of our engineered structures.

And somehow that test always seems to find

the flaws and the weak links in the structures.

In past earthquakes, we have

seen very graphically that unreinforced masonry structures, both bearing wall and
non-bearing wall, underreinforced structures, structures with soft first floors,
inadequately tied tilt-up structures, mobilehomes, houses that are not tied to
their foundations represent a significant seismic hazard.
In the 1971 San Fernando earthquake
1971

- we've referenced many times the year

we saw that there were some flaws in the design of the highway

structures and, in fact, that the current design codes and practices were not

-76-

adequate,

As a result

since that time.

reports on what Caltrans has been

old

On October 17, we learned some of

Ve saw

ssons from past

s.

the lessons that we relearned were

learned a few new lessons, but unfortunate
the difficult ones.

Ve've heard

many programs of retrofit were

that unreinforced masonry

were in

And we learned

terrible shape because of

that the highway

the structures that were known to be

structures were still hazardous, not

hazardous, but some of those even newer structures that experienced some
distress.

And now it's a sad

that we find that most of the lessons that

we learned in this earthquake are lessons that we probably should have learned in
earlier earthquakes.
Ve've heard much this

about the

certainly the collapse of that structure

ss viaduct structure, and

and the associated loss of life, tells

us that we still have a long way to go in

level of seismic

an

safety for the State of California.
with our

Ve knew in 1971 that we had a

•

structures.

Ve knew

Yes, steps were taken

that the codes that existed at that time were

to correct those deficiencies, but now 18 years later we find that we still have
not taken adequate steps to correct this problem.

From the seismic safety policy

point of view, this is simply unacceptable.
The highway structures were clearly a problem in this last earthquake, but I
think it's important we put that problem in perspective and in the proper
context.

First of all, the highway system in California is only one part of the

overall transportation system of the state, which includes not only highways but
also rail transportation, air, sea, and even

•
...1 ~nes.

I think we need to

realize that that's an interdependent system and that the failure of any one
element of that system will effect the other elements as well.
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We should be just

as concerned, and I'm sure that this committee will be as concerned, with the
failure of a control tower at SFO or backup electrical generators at that
airport, as well as damage to a runway in Oakland that shortens the runway.

We

see these kinds of failures for an earthquake which really had levels of ground
shaking, particularly at SFO, which were not very large.

And it leads one to

wonder what types of damage we might experience at these other transportation
systems with the groundshaking larger.

We must also look at rail transportation,

at docks, piers, and other forms of transportation.

So the first point is that

we must realize that the highway system is only one element of our overall state
transportation system.
We also need to realize that the transportation system itself is only one
element of our aging infrastructure statewide, which needs a great deal of
attention in order to make it seismically safe.

This ranges from unreinforced

masonry buildings, of which we have a great number in the state, to unreinforced
buildings of various heights, under-reinforced buildings, including many
state-owned buildings.

This represents a serious problem.

We also have potentially hazardous dam structures.

It's the total of all

these problems that we need to be addressing, and it's within that context that
we see that the highway problem is a particularly perplexing problem because it's
only one facet of a much larger issue.
that the seismic s
essential.

The Seismic Safety Commission has learned

program needs to have three elements, which are

One is an identification program, another is an effective mitigation

plan or strategy, and the third is an action plan.
First comes identification.
links in our infrastructure.

We need a program that would identify the weak

In every case of an earthquake that we've

experienced, there is usually a surprise.

We find there was some element that

was not as strong as it should have been.

That's not acceptable.
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We need to be

able to identify those elements of our infrastructure which are weak and which
The

need to be s

everyone who has looked at it
asked the question:

Yhy wasn'

ss structure has been identified now by nearly
a very weak structure,

people have also

this structure identified

structure?

Were we blinded

accepted practice?

questions?

Have we been asking the wrong people?

ly as a weak

Have we been asking the wrong
Yhy can't we identify

hazardous structures?
I don't mean to be judgmental in that regard.
problem, but it's a problem that we must resolve.

I think it's a very difficult
We must find thorough and

effective techniques for the identification of hazards, and we may need to do
this on more than just classes of structure.

We may need to identify specific

structures, individual structures, that are hazardous.

One of the problems I

think we had to date is that we've tended to

structures as being

hazardous, and that's making it difficult to
we can get to the place where we can ident
specifically, it will be easier then to

ize the greatest hazards.

If

hazardous structures more
just which structures need to

be addressed first, whether they be highway structures, airport structures, or
building structures.
I think it's interesting to note that as part of Mr. Roberts' testimony, he
indicated that two major universities completed studies of the Cypress structure
within less than three weeks after the event and that these studies indicated
that there was a strong probability of collapse with an acceleration level of
.17g.

One wonders then how difficult it would have been to have determined this

prior to the earthquake.

I know that hindsight is 100%; but these questions, I

think, need to be asked.
The second element we need is a strong, ambitious plan for mitigation.
Caltrans has and has had such a mitigation plan involving, as we've heard, the
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various phases of retrofit for the structures.

This strategy tended to treat

those structures on a general basis as a class, not specifically or individually;
and perhaps it's time that we need to look more carefully at the individual
structures and their specific nature, the nature of the local site and so on,
rather than just on a code basis.

As one of the committee members indicated

during this hearing, he wondered what would have happened if a group of experts
had been asked to look specifically at the Cypress structure to see what needed
to be done to that structure to make it seismically safe, rather than applying
the phase 1 retrofit to that structure, which was developed for really a
different type of engineered structure.

We must come up with effective

mitigation strategies, even if it requires, I believe, a case-by-case analysis of
some important structures.

If we don't have the technology, we need to develop

that technology.
Third, we need an action
because it involves money.

; and this is, of course, a very difficult part

We simply cannot wait another 18 years to solve the

highway problems or other seismic
state.

problems that we know we have in the

We must find ways to move ahead more quickly.

cost a great deal of money.

I believe this is going to

A site that could cost tens of millions of dollars

is going to cost hundreds of millions of dollars, probably is going to cost us
billions of dollars to do the job
choice.

That's a lot of money, but we have a

We can either spend some money now

more money in the future.
commitment to the kinds of
impact on seismic safety.

we can defer that and spend a lot

It's clear that there has not in the past been the
that we need to really make a significant
This is partly a problem of public apathy, and maybe

it's a problem with those of us who are pushing seismic safety.

Maybe we have

not been good enough advocates, but we need to do a better job.

We need to find

ways to fund it.

Unfortunately, I can't think of a way to fund public structure
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retrofits, except with public money.

to be a problem.

And that's

private sector, though, we can be more creative.

In the

We can try to find methods

individuals to do the retrofitting that

which will provide incentives for

needs to be done of many of our private structures.
One way to speed up the process may be to let the citizens of California
know what enormous cost is involved for not doing something.
Commission has, as part of its five-year seismic safety

The Seismic Safety
, an element to

determine the true economic cost of a significant earthquake in California.

And

that's not just the cost of rebuilding freeways or rebuilding buildings, but it's
the cost of unemployment, dislocation, the problems of lost productivity, which
we think will be very, very substantial.

The Commission has never been able to

get this particular study carried out.
Finally, I would just like to mention two things that the Commission has
found to be central to the whole process of identification and mitigation.
are research and independent review.

These

We've heard a great deal about research

this morning, and I'm pleased that that's the case.

Research provides the basis

for safe, economical, and efficient design and retrofit of structures.
happy to see that Mr. Best expressed a commitment to research.

I'm very

California has

traditionally led the nation, and some feel the world, in seismic safety
research.

However, most of the support for this research has come from the

federal government; and recently, quite frankly, that support has waned.

We are

now receiving less research monies than we have in the past, and our research
programs in California universities are severely impacted.

The State of

California simply must take a stronger role in seismic safety research if we are
to solve our seismic safety problems.
with research and education.

We are going to need to work hand in hand

We can do many things in research; but unless we

educate the next generation of researchers, we will lose that capability.
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Right

now, many of our programs in California are shrinking.
scientists and engineers as we did in the past.

Ve're not educating the

I'm concerned at what's going to

happen in years to come if we don't have the basis of educated scientists and
engineers to tackle the problems that we face.
The next thing I would like to briefly mention is the idea of independent
review.

The Commission has found that this is a very important element of any

seismic safety program.

Again, I am pleased with the statements that have been

made and actions that have been taken by Caltrans in this regard.

Ve need

independent review to assure a high level of seismic safety and design in
construction.

The use of independent review is not a sign of weakness or

inadequacy on the part of the organization using this approach.

On the contrary,

it's a prudent thing to do and shows a desire to do the best possible job.

Ve

applaud the steps that Caltrans has taken to review past and present plans for
highway structures, and we hope that this emphasis on independent review will
continue.

Ve think this is an extremely important part of the program.

I might just add a side note, a technical note, to comment on some of the
previous comments.

Mr. Roberts commented that there's no direct relationship

between the Richter magnitude of an earthquake and the peak acceleration that can
be experienced at a particular site.

I would like to also indicate that research

has found that there is no direct correlation between the peak acceleration
experienced at a site and the damage to a structure.

This is a very complex,

technical problem, and the damage involves such things as the frequency content
of the acceleration.

It also involves the duration of the acceleration, and it

may even involve the number of times the particular structure has been subjected
to shaking.

In fact, damage may be accumulative.

we need to look at.

These are all questions that

They are research issues which need to be addressed.
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In conclusion, I would like to

as we treated the lessons of the 1971 San Fernando

October 17, 1989
earthquake.

that we do not treat the lessons of the

saw the

At that time, we

structures and with many other structure
those problems for e

with our

that we were building.

years, and

We didn't solve

came back to haunt us last month.

It

won't be easy, but we must find the commitment and the resources to fix the
system now.

I

We can't afford to wait any longer.

Thank you.

I'd be happy to answer any questions.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

Have you in the past had as your charte

giving us a

figure for retrofit and for replacement?

DR. IWAN:

No, we have not.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

Do

you

lation to

you that charter

at this time?

DR. IWAN:

I don't know if it would

try to put together those kind of

legislation.
s without that

We probably could

lation.

I

think it's

not something that we ever have even been asked to do.

•

ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:
driven.

I don't think any of us want to see this politically

We don't want anybody to tell us what we want to hear, because it's a

nice, low number.

We need to fully understand what the problems are in this

state and go about finding the resources to fix them.

I don't know what those

all are.

But if we don't have a

It might be a whole host of different ways.

target -- someone once said it's better to set your target too high and miss it,
instead of too low and hit it.

California has been more or less saying that it's

been setting its sights too low and hitt
understand the scope of the problem.
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it.

But I think we need your he

to

DR. IVAN:

I certainly would like to do that; and as I say, I'm afraid that

when we write the bottom line, it's going to be a very large number.

It's going

to be in the billions of dollars.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

At the Senate

, Mr. Best apparently -- the Bee

reported -- said that after a survey, as the state stands, Caltrans concluded
about the state's bridges that none is at a risk of collapse in what is known as
a maximum credible earthquake.
DR. IVAN:

That is not your testimony today, is it?

I'm really not testifying on the details of the engineering

analysis of any particular bridge.

I'm not capable of doing that because I

haven't reviewed each one of those bridges.

I feel that we were very fortunate

in the earthquake that occurred on October 17 that the ground shaking in the area
that severely damaged the freeway structures was not really as high as it could
have been.

I think we need to continuually remind ourselves of that.

Just

because certain structures there did not collapse with this kind of ground
shaking, doesn't mean that we would consider them to be seismically safe.

The

ground shaking there could have been more like it was in Santa Cruz, and I think
we would have seen something much more severe.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN:

I guess the thing I would say is, when we use these

large numbers -- Caltrans today used

00-500 million, which

I would question

that figure because Caltrans does tend to give us low numbers on all their early
estimates.

But the bottom line is the repair of the freeways in California just

from this moderate earthquake will be three or four or five or six times that.
If we just took the money we're going to
messes and spend it on retrofit, redes

right now to clean up after our
and replacement, I think we'd be money

ahead over what we'll have to pay if go through another earthquake.
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MR. JAMES Y. MARSH:

Mr. Chairman, ladies.

I'm Jim Marsh, Regional Engineer

with the American Institute of Steel Construction.
that at the end of Yorld War
steel-framed.

I don't know if you realize

95% of the bridges in this state were

By now, it's just the reverse; 95% are concrete.

look at high-rise buildings.
isn't by accident.

Conversely, we

Today, 95% of the high-rise are steel-framed.

This

I think, if you talk to any structural engineer today who's

designing high-rise, he'll say he has a
the ability to absorb the energy.

confidence in the material with
what took place in this period of 40-45

years is very interesting in the sense that I think Caltrans became locked in on
the bottom line of the cost per square foot of the concrete, and so they
gradually transitioned over into that and left this state without one fabricator
in the steel bridge business any longer.

In the '50's, there were probably six

still in existence, Pacific Murphy up in the

Area which designed and erected

some of the bridges up there and the Coronado
What I'm getting at is this:

I think the time has come for Caltrans to

start shifting their views and

at all of the des

you cannot do one development without
think it would be

in San Pedro.

if Caltrans we

again.

As you know,

an environmental impact report.
to, say

I

not only use all the designs,

which would give you the present cost which they've been locked into before, but
say, let's look at the total cost of all these designs, whether it be steel,
concrete or composite systems.

Look at the maintenance cost through the life of

the structure and then add to that the retrofit cost, the site-specific
earthquake near that
of steel or if this

and say, what is that going to cost if this bridge is

is

concrete?

dollars and everything else to the

What is it going to cost in time,
for that bridge in the long run?

Maybe

we can get a little different design than we are experiencing today in the bridge
field.

88-

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

All right.

Thank you very much.

Anybody else?

Members,

thank you, and I appreciate people in the audience who stuck around and
participated in the hearing.

Thank you .

•
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STAFF REPORT
STAFF REPORT
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
INTERIM HEARING ON
THE SEISMIC SAFETY OF CALIFORNIA'S FREEWAY SYSTEM
November 7, 1989
Los Angeles, California
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of a major portion of the Cypress viaduct of the
Nimitz Freeway (Route 880) during the October 17 Lorna Prieta
Earthquake has focused the attention of the Legislature on the
structural integrity of thousands of bridges statewide,
particularly those located in high-risk earthquake areas, such as
the San Francisco Bay Area and the Los Angeles area.

That freeway structures (which include diverse facilities
such as overpasses, interchange flyovers, doubledeck roadways, and
"conventional" bridges) could be threatened by a major earthquake
was confirmed during the February 1971 Sylmar quake which caused
substantial damage to a number of highway facilities.

The need to

improve structural engineering practices for new facilities was
recognized, as was the need to "retrofit" existing ones.

Phase I Retrofit Program
The Department of Transportation (Caltrans) developed the
so-called "Phase I Retrofit" Program based on what it learned from
the 1971 Sylmar earthquake.

In essence, the Phase I program

generally involved tying together bridge decks with supporting
- 1 -
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us

cables, to avoid separation and collapse that might
an earthquake.

occur
flexibil

A structure would still have

to move, but the amount of motion would be constrained

acceptable parameters.

it would take until 1987 (16 years) for Caltrans
to complete Phase I retrofits as part of the Highway
Rehabilitation program.

Information obtained from Caltrans

indicates 1,262 structures were retrofitted, at a cost of
$54.2

llion ($47.3 million on state highways, and $6.9 million

on toll bridges).

At an average expenditure of approximately $3.4

million per year, Phase I could not have been considered a major
financial burden on the highway program.

Just to take one year as a representative example, in
1983-84,

state highway resources were in excess of

$1.8 billion, of which $413 million was allocated to highway
maintenance and another $350 million was allocated to highway
rehabil

ion (support and capital outlay).

An additional

$70 million was budgeted during that year for safety capital
outlay projects, to be spent on high-priority projects forecasted
to reduce accidents and reduce the state's liability exposure.

As

part of the process of prioritizing capital outlay projects each
year through the STIP (State Transportation Improvement Program)
process, the California Transportation Commission and Caltrans
first set aside funds for maintenance, rehabilitation, and safety
before programming most remaining resources for new construction.

- 2 -
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Phase I, as its name implies, was not viewed as the end to
seismic retrofitting.

Caltrans engineers were also concerned that

bridge columns could fail in the event of an earthquake, resulting
in bridge collapse.

The Phase I solution was primarily designed

to tie bridge superstructures together at hinges and supports, but
would do little i f bridge columns sheared and collapsed.

Caltrans has offered two explanations for deferring action on
column failure: first, columns performed well during the 1971
Sylmar Quake, and second, developing engineering solutions for
column retrofits was more of a challenge than the Phase I program.
To assist in research and development, a $418,000 contract was
awarded to the University of California, San Diego, late in 1987.

The Whittier Earthguake and Phase II
The Whittier Earthquake of October 1, 1987 provided a new
I

impetus to "get moving" on Phase II.

The focus was on the damaged

Route 605/5 interchange in Los Angeles County, where Phase I
improvements averted a major collapse but where columns were found
to be vulnerable.

According to a October 19, 1987 Caltrans memo,

"if this structure had been supported on single column bents,
rather than the 5-column bent, it probably would have collapsed"
(Memo of W.E. Schaefer, Deputy Director, Project Development to
Caltrans Director Leo Trombatore).

Phase II, then, was to be a

retrofit program for single-column structures consisting of steel
jackets surrounding weak columns; later, Phase III was
- 3 -
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conceptualized (but has yet to be developed) as a retrofit program
multi-column structures

such as the ill-fated Nimitz

In late 1987, Caltrans requested the California
Transportation Commission (CTC) to set aside $64 million for
Phase II retrofits over a four-year period (an average of $16
million per year), and anticipated that, "contracts can be
advertised as early as July 1, 1988." (Memo of W. E. Schaefer,
Op. cit).

While the CTC agreed and approved this funding level,

Caltrans did not submit any projects for funding in 1988-89.

In

the current year (89-90), Caltrans has had only two projects
(total cost: $1.2 million) ready to go as of last month ($724,000
for the Route 57/60 interchange in the City of Industry, and
$433,000 for the Route 405/710 interchange in Long Beach).

The

CTC advises that an additional $1 million will be requested in
December.

Thereafter, the next group of Phase II retrofit

projects is unlikely to be ready "for advertisement" until the
summer of 1990.

The delay in this project schedule has been

questioned.

The cost estimates to complete Phase II have also risen
sharply.

Caltrans has identified approximately 700 structures

requiring a Phase II retrofit; it is now clear that the 100
largest projects alone will consume the $64 million originally
requested for the entire Phase II program.

- 4 -

-93-

STAFF REPORT
Phase III - No Engineering Solution In Sight?
Phase III, as conceptualized, was to retrofit bridges with
multiple-column supports, such as the double-deck sections of the
Nimitz Freeway (Route 880) in Oakland, and the Embarcadero Freeway
(Route 480), the Southern Freeway Extension (Route 280), and the
Central Freeway (Route 101) in San Francisco.

Portions of the San

Francisco double-deck structures were severely damaged during the
Lorna Prieta Earthquake, and it is not yet clear that all of these
structures can be repaired or when they will reopen.
these structures are on relatively unstable Bay fill.

Most of
Cal trans

officials, responding to post-earthquake inquiries as to why this
phase was not yet underway, stated that appropriate engineering
solutions have not been developed.

Most attention has been focused on the state highway system.
There are also many older bridges owned by local agencies; the
City of Los Angeles alone is responsible for 416 bridges and is
developing a $112 million seismic upgrade program at this time.

•

Special Session Developments
At the just-concluded special session, the Legislature
approved AB 38X and SB 36X, which provide emergency funding for an
accelerated statewide bridge seismic assessment and retrofit
program.

The temporary sales tax will provide $80 million in

state funds:

$60 million to match an additional $240 million in

federal funds for the state highway system and $20 million for
local agencies for a total of $320 million, with highest priority

- 5 -
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to assessment of retrofit needs (including local road, rail
transit, and pedestrian bridges).
this

To highlight the importance of

sue and to guard against fund diversion for other highway

purposes, these new revenues will be deposited in a newly-created
separate account, the Seismic Safety Retrofit Account in the State
Transportation Fund.

While Caltrans will seek federal matching

funds, additional state resources will undoubtedly be needed as
well to reassure the people of California that our bridges are as
sa

as engineers can make them.
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Secretary

SEISMIC STRENGTHENING OF EXISTING BRIQGES
RECOMMENDATIONS
I

•

Adopt this report and forward it to the Mayor and City Council
requesting that:
1.

Appropriate action be taken to provide funding for the
strengthening of existing City bridges to provide protection
against major seismic episodes, with an estimated cost of
$150,000,000.

2.

Authorize the addition of 15 structural engineering and
geologist positions in the Bureau of Engineering to do the
necessary design work and that $350,000 be appropriated from
salary savings to fund these positions for the balance of the
fiscal year.

3.

Authorize the Bureau to issue Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for
the hiring of consultants to assist the Bureau in analysis and
design preparation. Funding for the work to be included in the
1990-91 budget •

4.

Authorize $2, 100, ooo for accelerating the design completion
and construction of the restrainer program.

TRANSMITTALS

•

1.

Copy of letter from Mayor Tom Bradley dated October 24, 1989,
asking that all bridges in the City be inspected and
recommendations for strengthening be presented.

2.

Priority List of Future Seismic Strengthening Projects.

3.

Earthquake Priority List of Multi-Span Vehicular Bridges owned
by City of Los Angeles Only dated October 27, 1989.

DISCUSSION
The City's infrastructure is a fragile system that can readily be
affected by major seismic events.
The Santa Cruz earthquake on
October 17, 1989, re-emphasized this condition by causing major
damage to bridges almost 60 miles from the epicenter.
For this
reason a new urgency as expressed in the Mayor's letter has
developed to extend and complete the City's Seismic Strengthening
of Bridges program (Transmittal No. 1).
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71 earthquake, a re-evaluation of design criteria was
what changes would have to be made to protect
As a result of that study it was determined
restrainers be added to certain bridges.
These
essentially tie the structure together so that the
not
1 apart. This work has proceeded slowly :because
limitations. The status of this work is as follows:
ects completed:
15 bridges
ects approved for
Construction:.
14 :bridges
ects not Scheduled: 43 bridges
No. 2)

Cost:

$3,621,810

Est. Cost:

1,238,000
$1,631,000

there are 1,014 bridges of which 416 are City
, there are 15 vehicular tunnels, 221 pedestrian
other structures.
structures are inspected on a regular basis to assure that
are
ly sound.
It is to be noted that not all of
major structures.
bridge constructed in the City is the North
which was built in 1909. During the next 23 years
were constructed.
These bridges are generally those
cross
Los Angeles River.
is the 6th Street Bridge which is 3,584 feet
1932 and carries about 12,100 cars per day.
traveled . bridge among these bridges is the
Viaduct over Riverside Drive and Los Angeles
s bridge carries 41,200 vehicles per day.
bridges owned by the City of Los Angeles are
the Los Angeles River located between Washington
North Broadway. These bridges carry an average daily
21,300 vehicles per day.
studies have been made by various agencies to further
the
ility of bridge structures subject to seismic
City staff has been and will continue working with
doing our bridge strengthening studies and will be
resources in pursuing this program.
As a result of
these studies, staff has made a preliminary list of bridges
requiring further work and also a preliminary cost estimate of
seismic strengthening.
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1989

List of Multi-Span Vehicular
owned
by the
Los Angeles only (Transmittal No. 3)
136
bridges
require strengthening. Multi-span bridges are
usually
ical in major earthquakes than the typical
smal
s
structures.
The current estimated cost of
strengthening
136 multi-span bridges is approximately
$111,000,000. The estimate for strengthening the remaining City
bridges is not expected to exceed $40,000,000. The estimates have
been made without detailed analysis and the actual costs could
increase s
ficantly if some bridges require total replacement.
The converse
also true that the dollar amount could be less if
the bridges, a
examination, are found to meet current codes.
Finane
tax, general

accomplished by either an increase in the gas
bonds, or possibly revenue bonds.
,000,000 estimated cost and with construction
an increase in the gas tax ~f three cents
the City to generate $15,000,000 per year of
present program. However, proposals to greatly
of the program will reduce the funds available
If the modifications to the program are
that it will require six cents per gallon
$15,000,000 per year seismic strengthening
igation bonds sold over a ten
an additional $1,200,000 per year the
approximately $13,100,000 after the tenth year
This assumes concurrent retirement
debt

•

If the bonds are revenue bonds funded by gasoline taxes and issued
over ten years
first year will require approximately 0.5
per gallon, increasing to 4.75 cents at the end of ten years. The
proposed new gas tax allocation is assumed in these figures.
It is recommended that the following 15 positions be approved to
do the necessary design work and construction management:

1 Structural Engineer
4 Structural Engineering Associates
3 Civil Engineering Assistants
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2
2
1

Engineering Drafting Technicians
Engineering Associates
Typist

Soils and Geology
1 Assistant Engineering Geologist
1 Engineering Geologist

Consultants will be needed in the first three years of the program
to give an early surge to the evaluation of the critical bridges
and to provide a backlog of construction documents. Funding for
the consultants will not be required until the 1990-91 fiscal year
because of the time required to develop, circulate, receive and
evaluate the RFPs; hold interviews; negotiate and execute
contracts~ and start work.
The process takes a minimum of six
months. The consultant services will cost an estimated $2,000,000
per year.
If it is determined that general obligation bonds are to be the
source of funding, it is recommended that additional funds in an
estimated amount of $50,000,000 be included to reinforce existing
City building facilities. These projects are not eligible for gas
tax financing.
(

Report

RKH

by:

STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING DIVISION
Rodney K. Haraga
Division Engineer
Ext. 53871

RHK

)

Respectfully

>ffd,;-~___.,_,
ROBERT S. HORII
CITY ENGINEER

RKH:RHK:dmd/BRDRPTlO.RPT
OlSED-cf.wp
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RrL
s in response to your letter of October 20, 1989
rma ion relating to our seismic retrofit program.
the same sequence as the questions on page two
to
ermine retrofit priorities has been based
rge extent on our experience in previous earthquakes
the 1971 San Fernando event). These ear
kes
that our largest problem was keeping the bridges
their expansion joints (i.e., primari
hinges
ments and intermediate bents).
usion was derived from a thorough investigation of
Fernando earthquake after 1971 and has been supported
erience in subsequent events such as the 980
fshore earthquake, the 1986 Palm Springs
and the 1987 Whittier earthquake.
pas earthquakes showed us that brid
prior to 1971 were most vulnerable from the r
ling apart and that this type of failure cou d
ives and cause serious property damage
ter the
ke, a survey of our bridge inventory identified
30 bridges which contained narrow, unrestrained
i n joints. These factors caused us to make the
fit of our unrestrained expansion joints our number one
ity. This effort is now complete and all vulnerable
t r
out the State have been restrained.
past earthquakes identified that the second most
area of concern was the integrity of the s n e
ver ca column members which support the bridges. The 1971
San Fernando earthquake showed that our narrow single column
bridges were more vulnerable to damage than our wider multic
type bridges. Since that time no earthquake (including
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the 1987 Whittier earthquake) has indicated that any of our
single column bents were in danger of collapse. Modern
computer analysis, however, is beginning to provide us with
insight into the extremely complex performance of the single
column type bridge and our conclusions are that retrofitting
to improve the ductility of single column bridges is prudent
in order to increase the serviceability of the bridge.
All remaining bridges (primarily multi-column type
structures) were designated to be included in Phase 3 of our
retrofit program. These bridges sustained damage in previous
earthquakes but did not collapse. At the completion of Phase
3, every bridge within the highest seismic zones of the State
will have been screened and evaluated and these bridges will
have the same factor of safety as all bridges constructed to
modern seismic standards.
2)

Bridge Retrofit Prioritization
Phase 1 -- Bridges were identified by screening the
approximately 15,000 bridges on the State system for
vulnerable expansion joint details identified as a result of
the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. Vulnerable details
included narrow support lengths, weak bearings, etc. These
bridges were placed on a needs list and prioritized based on
the following considerations:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Seismic Potential
Replacement Cost
Replacement Cost Relative to Retrofit Cost
Available Detour Length
Average Daily Traffic
Defense Route On or Under the Bridge
Major Route On or Under the Bridge
Facility Crossed (State Route, Federal Route,
Railroad)

Projects (contracts) were developed by combining several of
the prioritized bridges based on geographic proximity to each
other. Project priorities varied but every attempt was made
to include the highest priority bridges in the earliest
projects.
Phase 2 -- By this time we had a better understanding as to
where earthquakes would most likely cause damage to bridges,
thus the list of bridges to be screened and prioritized was
limited to those within the 0.5g contour lines surrounding
high potential faults.
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High potential faults included in this screening were:
Whittier, Elsinore, Whittier-Elsinore, Newport-Inglewood,
Malibu Coast-Santa Monica-Raymond, Simi-Santa Rosa,
Northridge, Santa Ynez, More Ranch-Arroyo Parida-San
Cayetano, Red Mountain, Pitas Point-Ventura, Oakridge, San
Andreas (South), San Jacinto, Mission Creek, Brawley, Brawley
South, Clark, Coyote Creek, Superstition Hills, Superstition
Mountain, Imperial, White Mountain North, White Mountain
South, Fish Mountain, Owens Valley, Independence, Sierra
Nevada, Hayward, Rodgers Creek, San Andreas (San Francisco
South), Sargent, Zayante-Vergales, San Andreas (South of Cape
Mendocino), Little Salmon-Yager, Mad River and Patricks Point
as defined on the Division of Mines and Geology Map Sheet 45
(1987).
This resulted in a list of about 2,500 single column type
bridges. Prioritization of these bridges was based on:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

•

Fault Proximity (Ground Acceleration)
Age of Bridge (pre- or post-1971)
Length of Bridge
Average Daily Traffic
Route Type Crossed (Interstate, Federal, State,
County, City)
Available Detour Length
Skew of Bridge

Over 500 bridges have already been identified from the list
of 2,500, however, screening is still underway and it is
anticipated that about 700 bridges will comprise the final
Phase 2 list. The screening process includes a review of
portions of the original plans by at least three engineers
who recommend inclusion or exclusion from the program based
on our past damage experience combined with our recent
analytical knowledge.
Projects (contracts) are being developed by combining several
of the prioritized bridges based on geographic proximity to
each other. To date approximately 100 bridges have been
assigned a project status and work is currently underway to
assemble the remaining bridges into projects. Project
priorities vary but every attempt is being made to include
the highest priority bridges in the earliest projects.
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Phase 3 -- The prioritization of the rema1n1ng bridges inside
the 0.5g contour surrounding the high potential faults has
just begun and will be modified based on what we are learning
from the effects of the Lorna Prieta earthquake. All
multi-level viaduct structures will be given the highest
priority in this effort and work will proceed immediately on
preparation of retrofit contracts for these bridges.
Concurrent with the retrofit of these multi-level viaducts,
we will be receiving input from our contracted research at
the University of California at Berkeley in order to verify
the effectiveness of the retrofit measures and techniques.
All prioritization of the Phase 3 program will be similar to
the Phase 2 effort except that the multi-level facilities
will be given the highest priority. Completion of the Phase
3 program will mean that every bridge inside the 0.5g contour
of the high potential faults will have been given a detailed
scrutiny and retrofit when required.

3)

Phase 1 seismic retrofit projects were submitted as
candidates for financing as rehabilitation projects and
competed with other highway safety projects for funding. The
Department spent about $54 million on these projects at a
rate of $3 to $4 million per year. In all previous
earthquakes, there had been two deaths related to State
highways and bridges. The retrofit program process was
considered as part of the total highway safety package. This
included fixes to ''blood allies" that claimed hundreds of
lives annually in traffic accidents. Obviously, Caltrans'
priorities are now being revised.

4)

We presently have an initial four-year Phase 2 program of $64
million which is included in the 1988 State Transportation
Improvement Program (STIP). This program will retrofit
single column bents. Detail design is underway on 30
projects and the first two were funded by the CTC during
their October 1989 meeting. Construction will commence in a
few months. Substantial additional funds will be necessary
to complete work on all prioritized single column bridges.
The CTC first allocated funding for Phase 2 in December 1987.
The needed research contracts (testing of 1/2 scale models)
were underway early in 1987 but actual model testing was not
begun until mid-1988. Design was commenced in the Spring of
1988 with plans completed later that year.

5)

Phase 1 -- Attachment A is a list of bridges where Phase 1
retrofit was accomplished, sorted by districts. Southern
California could be defined as districts 7, 8, and 11. The
recently established District 12 is not segregated.
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Phase 2 -- Attachment B is a list of Phase 2 candidates
sorted by District, County, Route.
Phase 3 -- In addition to the two-level structures,
Embarcadero Viaduct, Central Viaduct, Southern Viaduct and
China Basin Viaduct in San Francisco, all other multi-column
bridges are candidates. We have identified 5,000+
(Attachment C) such bridges on the State System. From experience gained at the San Fernando earthquake, we
clearly felt that keeping bridges on the bearings was the
most important retrofit we could perform. We immediately
proceeded with this program on a statewide basis while
continually improving our analytical technology and
construction details. We feel this program has saved many
bridges during subsequent seismic events.
The single column bent program lacked the analytical
technology until 1987. Without that and the retrofit
research and model testing, we would have been shooting in
the dark for techniques to use for retrofitting columns.
Phase

6)

is complete.

Phase 2

Research is approximately half complete
95 percent of needs identified
25 percent programmed by project and in various
stages of design
Two projects voted by CTC -- construction to start
in early 1990

Phase 3

Just starting to identify needs list
Research is commencing immediately

Yes, the Department is preparing an expedited program for
retrofitting structures. We are nearing completion of Phase
2 retrofit research. Funding for the first contracts has
been approved and construction should be completed by the end
of 1992. We are initiating immediate research with UC
Berkeley for Phase 3, the multi-column bents, which will
identify failure modes and details requiring retrofitting.
We anticipate that many of the retrofit techniques developed
in Phase 2 will be used in the Phase 3 program. In essence
the old concepts of Phases 2 and 3 are being changed. We are
expediting review and analysis of bridges identified for
Phase 3. Phase 2 and Phase 3 will overlap as much as
possible; however, the Phase 3 research will take a couple of
years. Meanwhile we can get some projects underway by the
middle of 1991. Until we have a better idea of the retrofit
actions that will be necessary, no accurate cost estimates
can be made. Completing all high-priority bridges will cost
several hundred million dollars.
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7)

In a maximum credible earthquake, we expect that our
structures will sustain damage but will not collapse. We are
reviewing our bridges with the new knowledge that we are
acquiring, and at this time we have no reason to believe that
any one of the structures is unsafe.
All of the highway structures constructed since 1971,
including the Harbor Transitway, were or are being
constructed using the details which evolved from the San
Fernando earth-quake and have been designed using the very
latest seismic design criteria. In conjunction with District
7, in Los Angeles, we are conducting a peer review of the
Harbor Transitway plans prior to the start of construction on
the structure itself.
The "4 level" interchange has been retrofitted with catcher
blocks at the abutment to keep the structure on its supports.
The substructure is of the multi-column type with several
additional diaphragms connecting adjacent frames. This
interchange experienced no identifiable damage in either the
Whittier or the San Fernando earthquakes. We do not expect
any damage such as occurred at Cypress Street to occur at
this location. This bridge is safe for public traffic.
We will certainly include these bridges in our review for the
Phase 2 and Phase 3 retrofit programs as we will all other
bridges. Multi-level structures will receive the highest
priority.

Attachments

-105-

MR. l•JILLIAM LEONARD

TESTIMONY
WILLIAM LEONARD, VICE-CHAIRMAN
CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITIEE
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•

I AM PLEASED FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY
TRANSPORTATION COMMITIEE ON BEHALF OF OUR CHAIRMAN, JOE DUFFEL,
REPRESENTING THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION.

ON OCTOBER 17TH AT 5:04PM OUR FELLOW CALIFORNIANS EXPERIENCED A
DISASTER OF IMMENSE PROPORTIONS. THIS EVENT WHICH WE HAVE LONG
DREADED THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA BROUGHT DEVASTATION TO ONE OF
THE LOVELIEST AND MOST HISTORIC AREAS OF OUR STATE- THE SAN
FRANCISCO BAY AREA. IN SPITE OF THE INCREDIBLE DESTRUCTION THERE
WAS MUCH TO GIVE THANKS. THE IMMEDIATE REACTION OF CALTRANS,
STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, AND OUR FELLOW CITIZENS IN THE BAY AREA
DID MUCH TO MITIGATE THE LOSS AND SUFFERING. IT IS WELL TO BEAR IN
MIND AS WE SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THIS TERRIBLE TOLL, AN EARTHQUAKE OF
SIMILAR MAGNITUDE IN ARMENIA LAST YEAR CAUSED THE LOSS OF LIFE TO
25,000 PEOPLE.

ON OCTOBER 18TH, THE DAY FOLLOWING, CALTRANS BRIEFED THE
COMMISSION ON THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS DAY AND THEIR
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION. AT THAT MEETING THE COMMISSION
ADOPTED TWO POLICIES REGARDING EMERGENCY REPAIR FUNDING WHICH
WERE IMMEDIATELY COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVERNOR, THE LEGISLATIVE
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LEADERSHIP AND THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION. IN SUMMARY THOSE
POLICIES ARE:

1.

ANY STATE FUNDING FOR EMERGENCY REPAIRS AND RESTORATION OF
THE STATE'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM SHOULD COME FROM THE
GENERAL FUND EMERGENCY RESERVE FUND RATHER THAN THE STATE
HIGHWAY ACCOUNT. THERE IS FRANKLY NO OTHER CHOICE FOR PRIOR
TO THE EARTHQUAKE WE HAD ALREADY ADVISED THE APPROPRIATE
OFFICIALS THAT THE STATE HIGHWAY ACCOUNT WOULD LIKELY BE
DEPLETED BY THE END OF THE CURRENT BUDGET YEAR.

2.

THAT THOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL EMERGENCY REPAIR
HIGHWAY FUNDS BE EASED TO PERMIT AN APPROPRIATE FEDERAL
RESPONSE. THOSE RESTRICTIONS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING FIVE
POINTS:

(1)
(2)

·CURRENT $100 MILLION CAP BE RAISED
MORE REVENUE SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE EMERGENCY REPAIR
FUND

(3)

CURRENT 90 DAY WAIVER OF STATE MATCH SHOULD BE EXTENDED

(4)

EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND SHOULD NOT BE CREDITED AGAINST A
STATE'S GUARANTEED MINIMUM RETURN OF FEDERAL FUNDING

(5)

TOLL FACILITIES SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR EMERGENCY REPAIR
FUNDS

WE ARE PLEASED THAT THIS COMMITTEE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN
BRINGING HOME THE BACON. AS YOU KNOW FOR THIS TRAGEDY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID

1.

PROVIDE $1 BILLION THAT HAS A SHELF LIFE OF TWO YEARS.
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2.

THAT THE 90 DAY WAIVE OF STATE MATCH HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 180
DAYS.

3.

TOLL ROADS ARE ELIGIBLE FOR EMERGENCY REPAIR FUNDS.

4.

THESE FUNDS WON'T BE CHANGED AGAINST FUTURE
APPORTIONMENTS TO CALIFORNIA.

IF CALIFORNIA IS TO MAXIMIZE THE FEDERAL BENEFITS THAT HAVE BEEN
MADE AVAILABLE IT IS INCUMBENT THAT WE NOW MOVE WITH DESPATCH.

AT THE COMMISSION MEETING ON THE 19TH, WE MADE THE NECESSARY
FINDINGS TO PERMIT EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE TO OPERATE WITHOUT
VIOLATING ANY COVENANTS ON THE TOLL BRIDGE BONDS.

REHABILITATION OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY AND FREEWAY SYSTEM HAS
ALWAYS BEEN ASSIGNED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR AVAILABLE FUNDING.
SEISMIC RETROFIT PROJECTS ARE A PART OF THE REHABILITATION

•

PROGRAM. AS INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS HAVE BEEN READIED BY CALTRANS
FOR CONSTRUCTION, THE COMMISSION WITHOUT EXCEPTION HAS
ALLOCATED CONSTRUCTION FUNDS SO THAT CONTRACTS COULD BE

•

AWARDED. IN RECENT YEARS OF FUNDING SHORTAGES IT HAS BEEN
NECESSARY TO CURTAIL NEW CAPACITY PROJECTS IN ORDER TO ASSURE
THAT REHABILITATION INCLUDING SEISMIC RETROFIT COMES FIRST.

LET ME QUICKLY SUM UP THE BRIDGE SEISMIC RETROFIT PROGRAM. FROM
THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SAN FERNANDO EARTHQUAKE CALTRANS
WAS AUTHORIZED TO DEVELOP A RETROFIT PROGRAM ON SELECTED
BRIDGES THAT EITHER HAD NARROW BEARING SEATS OR TALL UNSTABLE
BEARINGS IN AREAS OF HIGH SEISMIC POTENTIAL. PHASE 1 IS 99%
COMPLETE. THERE WERE 1262 BRIDGES IN THIS PROGRAM WHICH HAS COST
SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF $54 MILLION. CURRENTLY 13 ARE UNDER CONTRACT
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AND THE LAST KNOWN ONE IS UNDER DESIGN. THIS LAST PROJECT IS AN
UPGRADE OF A PREVIOUS HINGE RESTRAINER PROJECT.

PHASE 2 WAS APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION FOR INCLUSION IN THE 1988
STIP IN DECEMBER 1987. THIS SECOND RETROFIT PROGRAM WAS TO
CORRECT THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1987 WHITTIER EARTHQUAKE.
THIS PROGRAM ENTAILED THE STRENGTHENING OF SINGLE COLUMN
STRUCTURES THROUGH THE USE OF METAL JACKETS. A TOTAL OF $64
MILLION WAS PROGRAMMED FOR AN ESTIMATED 767 BRIDGES TO BE
COMPLETED OVER A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD. NOW THAT PROJECT REPORTS
ARE COMING INTO HEADQUARTERS IT IS MY PERSONAL BELIEF THAT THE $64
MILLION WILL PROVE TO BE MOST INADEQUATE AND THE FINAL COST FOR
THESE BRIDGES WILL MORE THAN LIKELY BE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF

$200 MILLION. IN FACT, CALTRANS NOW ESTIMATED THAT THE ENTIRE $64
MILLION ALREADY PROGRAMMED WILL BE CONSUMED BY THE FIRST 100 OF
THESE BRIDGES. THE FIRST TWO OF THESE PROJECTS TOTALING $1.2
MILLION WAS APPROVED AT OUR OCTOBER 1989 MEETING. AS IS TRUE ON
ANY NEW PROGRAM, PROJECT REPORTS, THE NECESSARY RESEARCH,
TESTING, AND DESIGN ALL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF LEAD TIME. THE
COMMISSION HAS ASKED THE DEPARTMENT FOR AN UPDATED SCHEDULE
AND COST AND TO ADVISE THE COMMISSION WHAT EFFORTS CAN BE MADE
TO ACCELERATE THIS PROGRAM.

AT THE OCTOBER MEETING THE COMMISSION WAS ADVISED OF A PHASE 3
CATEGORY WHICH INCLUDES THOSE HIGHWAY BRIDGES WITH MULTIPLE
COLUMNS THAT REQUIRE SEISMIC RETROFIT ATTENTION FOR WHICH THERE
IS NO SPECIFIC ENGINEERING SOLUTION YET DECIDED ON. THE NIMITZ IS AN
UNFORTUNATE EXAMPLE OF THIS CATEGORY. PHASE 31S CERTAINLY A NEW
CATEGORY. THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM BOTH THE SYLMAR AND THE
WHITTIER EARTHQUAKES DID NOT INDICATE A POSSIBLE FAILURE INTO THE
-109-

MR. WILLIAM LEONARD
5

MULTI-COLUMN STRUCTURES THAT THIS PHASE WILL DEAL WITH. THE
COMMISSION HAS ASKED TO BE ADVISED OF THE SPECIFIC LOCATIONS THAT
FALL WITHIN THIS CATEGORY.

IN CONCLUSION LET ME MAKE A PERSONAL OBSERVATION. THE SAN
FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17TH IS A CATASTROPHE THAT WILL
LONG BE REMEMBERED. NO ONE KNOWS PRECISELY WHEN OR WHERE THE
NEXT EARTHQUAKE WILL BE CENTERED, THOUGH WE DO KNOW WITH A HIGH
DEGREE OF CERTITUDE THAT THERE WILL BE ANOTHER. ONE THING WE DO
KNOW IS THAT THERE WILL BE FREQUENT AND CONTINUING CATASTROPHES
THAT WILL HEAVILY IMPACT THE MOTORING PUBLIC. IT MAY BE FIRE, FLOOD,
SLIPPAGE, FOG WITH THE RESULTANT MULTI-CAR PILE UP OR EVEN A SINGLE
CAR ACCIDENT. WHATEVER, IT CERTAINLY IS A TRAGEDY TO THOSE
INVOLVED. THE COMMISSION IS VERY SENSITIVE TO THOSE CONCERNS.
MOST EVERY CAPITAL PROJECT WE AUTHORIZE IS A SAFETY PROJECT,
DESIGNED TO SAVE LIVES AND PROTECT PROPERTY. WE ONLY VOTE
AMENITY PROJECTS SUCH AS SOUND ATTENUATION WALLS OR
I

LANDSCAPING WHEN ITS MANDATED OR ITS THE PRICE OF GETTING FEDERAL
FUNDS FOR A PROJECT THAT MEETS THE CRITERIA OF PROTECTING PEOPLE
AND PROPERTY. THE COMMISSION IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE

1

NECESSITY OF ASSURING A SAFE, RELIABLE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
WHOSE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR IS ADEQUATELY FUNDED AS A PRIORITY
OVER AND ABOVE OTHER INVESTMENTS IN THAT SYSTEM.

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ADDITIONAL FUNDING BE PROVIDED TO FULLY
REIMBURSE THE EMERGENCY EXPENDITURES FROM THE SEVERELY LIMITED
STATE HIGHWAY ACCOUNT. WE MUST NOT ONLY RAISE SUFFICIENT FUNDS
TO REPAIR THE EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE, BUT TO SHORE UP DAMAGED
ROADWAYS TO AVOID FUTURE FAILURES AND TO PROVIDE CONGESTION
RELIEF AND ACCELERATE OUR SEISMIC RETROFIT PROGRAM. CALTRANS
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AND THE COMMISSION ARE OUT OF MONEY TO MEET THE TRANSPORTATION
NEEDS OF THIS RICH STATE AND VERY COMPETITIVE ECONOMY.
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By
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J. David Rogers, Ph.D., P.E., G.E.
Rogers/Pacific, Inc.
Pleasant Hill, California
QUALIFICATIONS
A.

Ph.D. in Geological and Geotechnical Engineering from the
University of California, Berkeley.

B.

Registered Civil Engineer, Geotechnical Engineer and General
Engineering Contractor in California. Registration in Geology
and Engineering Geology currently pending.

C.

Principal author of numerous articles and publications dealing
with engineering geology of the San Francisco East Bay and
consultant to 25 Bay Area governmental agencies and
municipalities.

D.

Co-authored a proposal for studying the seismic safety of the
failed Cypress Structure section of I-880 with Professor
Jerome M. Raphael at U.C. Berkeley in 1978. Received earthquake engineering education while at Berkeley.

E.

In private practice for the past 10 years and frequent lecturer for five universities and numerous government agencies.

•

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CYPRESS STRUCTURE
The failed Cypress double-deck freeway structure was constructed in 195557 in two main contracts as part of then State Route 17, or Eastshore
Freeway. Route 17 was conceived by the State Division of Highways in the
late 1940's. The highway's northern terminus was in the Oakland Distribution Structure, a complex interchange connecting four freeways/expressways
with the Oakland-Bay Bridge. The southern terminus of the highway was at
its juncture with the Bayshore Freeway {U.S. 101, in San Jose).
Actual
construction of the route began in 1949 and was completed some 10 years
later, whereupon it was renamed the "Nimitz Freeway", after Fleet Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz, whose family had long resided in nearby Berkeley. The
Nimitz retained its nomenclature as State Route 17 until 2-1/2 years ago
when it was redesignated as Interstate Route 880, or I-880.
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A structural kingpin of the Nimitz was the Cypress double-deck viaduct at
the freeway's junction with the Oakland Distribution Structure. Design by
the Division of Highway's Bridge Department in Sacramento began in 1951,
with the final plans being issued in late 1954. In the early 1950's, commuter and commercial traffic traveling up the East Bay toward the Bay
Bridge or points north swung around the congestion of downtown Oakland,
along a broad, 6-lane boulevard named Cypress Street, which had been
widened and improved in the mid-1930's and late 1940's. The Cypress corridor was then carrying approximately 50,000 vehicles per day (on a 24hour basis during weekdays).
The Bridge Department design team was headed by the late Stewart Mitchell
under the direction of Chief Bridge Engineer Frederick W. Panhorst. This
duo was very experienced, having designed the Oakland-Bay Bridge, the
graceful concrete arch spans on the Big Sur Highway, over the Arroyo Seco
in Pasadena, and virtually every freeway project since the first, the
Pasadena, which was opened in 1940. A younger engineer, Clayton R.
Giroux, had joined the Bridge Department in 1948, and he eventually became
the Project Designer and a specialist in double-deck freeways, later
designing San Francisco's similar Central and Embarcadero freeways.
Giroux retired from CALTRANS in 1986 (and does not need to be bothered by
the Press; he is actively co-operating with members of the various investigating teams).
Design concepts for a modern freeway, running through what was then (1951)
a pricy heavy industrial area, were extremely complicated.
Over a 1.3
mile distance, the proposed route had to cross 24 existing city streets, 3
railroad spurs serving industry, miss the Oakland Army Base railroad yard,
access to the Southern Pacific Railroad Depot, and just skirt the largest
sewage treatment plant in the East Bay, with dozens of incoming sewer
trunk lines.
In addition, the 6 existing lanes of the Cypress commuter
corridor must necessarily remain open during freeway construction so as
not to create intolerable (not to mention politically unacceptable) congestion.
The compromise reached by the bridge design team was to create an extended
double-deck structure, not to unlike those emanating from the San Francisco anchorage of the Bay Bridge (built in 1934-37). A doubly-supported
deck structure possessed a number of important advantages:
A.

It required the least amount of right-of-way, thereby saving
the State land acquisition money. At this time, the heavy industrial properties in that area, such as steel fabricating
plants, would have been very expensive to condemn and relocate.

B.

An elevated freeway would create the least disruption to the
neighborhood's well-established infrastructure (railroads,
commuter rail lines,
streets,
trolley lines, buried
utili ties).
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A double-deck structure could be built with a m~n~mum of disruption to the existing commuter corridor by buying only
enough land (some 75') to create two three-lane streets on
either side of the freeway while it was under construction {a
2-1/2 year process). In this way, Cypress Avenue was split,
with the north-bound lanes paralleling the east side of the
freeway and the south-bound lanes on the west side.
These
streets were left in place to improve traffic mobility in the
affected area, and the contractor could stage his work in the
75' strip of land between the two streets.

The double-decked freeway section would be a little over 6,800 feet long
and was to be California's first. The two 52-foot-wide roadways were to
be of the concrete box girder type, supported on multiple column reinforced concrete bents . Bent spacings were from 70 to 80 feet, with 124
bents in all.
The upper deck would be supported some 50 feet above the
ground, and many of the upper supporting girders were reinforced with
post-tensioned rods, an early form of the pre-stress concrete method
routinely employed in concrete structures today.
The finished structure
would be able to handle 200, 000 vehicles per day, which easily met the
20-year projections routinely applied to such projects during that time
period {1951-54).
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEISMIC DESIGN CONCEPTS IN CALIFORNIA
Reinforced concrete and steel structures technology evolved markedly
during the post-World War II boom years as increasingly larger and larger
structures were built.
By the late 1960's, the entire concept of reinforced concrete design changed over from the traditionally-employed working stress design approach to the current ultimate strength design procedures {American Concrete Institute, 1971). Other significant code changes
included the employment of continuous spiral reinforcement in load-bearing
columns which came about around 1968.
Most of these changes emanated from the consulting structural engineering
community who were continuing to press the limits in designing larger and
more complicated structures.
Earthquake loading was a source of great concern to California's civil engineers whose awareness was piqued during Magnitude 6-1/4 quakes which
Santa Barbara's
damaged Santa Barbara in 1925 and Long Beach in 1933.
municipal water system had been severely crippled in their quake, and
Sheffield Dam, a hydraulic fill structure, had been destroyed (Engineering
News Record, 1925). The 1933 Long Beach event occurred in close proximity
to a more highly developed area and numerous structural collapses forced
major changes in the Uniform Building Code and mandated special professional registration for structural engineers.
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But, what followed was a paucity of seismic tremors. Seismographs at Cal
Tech in Pasadena recorded the 1933 Long Beach event (which was epicentered
offshore on the Newport-Inglewood fault}, with one station recording a
peak acceleration of 0.13g, or 13% of the force of gravity applied
laterally.
In 1940, a Magnitude 7.1 tremor rocked the El Centro area {Johnson and
Hill, 1982).
Strong motion recorders in the area were located inside
structures located on deep alluvium (in lieu of bedrock}.
The May 18,
1940, El Centro quake was the largest quake of record in the new era of
seismography which began in the mid-1930's, having a maximum recorded acceleration of 0.33g.
The raw El Centro strong motion records were synthesized into structural response spectra which were widely disseminated
to the engineering profession for use in structural design. This data included time histories of simple motion and response to single degree of
freedom systems, structural response characteristics critical to seismic
design. The synthesized El Centro data was the first of this kind to be
employed in California, and it was the strongest motion data (but not
necessarily the greatest acceleration data) available until the San Fernando Quake in 1971. Subsequent measurements at Parkfield in 1967 (0.50g)
and San Fernando in 1971 (1.25g) suggested that much higher accelerations
were possible than previously realized.
The designers of the ill-fated
Cypress Structure utilized a 0.06g horizontal acceleration from the 1940
El Centro quake in their 1951-54 design.
The first major structure actually designed to account for earthquake
loading in the United States was Morris Dam, a concrete gravity structure,
built on the San Gabriel River in San Gabriel Canyon by the City of
Pasadena in 1932-35. A fault was discovered in the dam foundation during
excavation work, so the dam was designed for 6-1/2 feet of tectonic offset and a lateral load of O.lOg was applied pseudostatically upon the dam,
causing its design to be thickened (Morris and Pierce, 1934; Engineering
News Record, 1938}. Pseudostatic loads were applied to designs to simulate lateral earthquake loads, but these assume that such a load is constant when, in fact, it is quite transient.
In July 1952, California was rocked by a major tremor of Magnitude 7.6
near Tehachapi on the White Wolf fault zone. Major highway and railroad
closures over the Tehachapi Pass resulted, but no strong-motion instruments were located close to the shock's epicenter and the quake was completely unexpected.
A new awareness of seismic loading and structural response of modern,
well-engineered structures came about with the 1964 Good Friday quake in
Anchorage, Alaska. The event measured in at a whopping 8.4 on the Richter
Scale, the largest quake in America this Century. The destruction was extensive , with ground shaking 1 as ting some 3 to 4 minutes ( the 1906 San
Francisco quake shook for 52 seconds and is estimated to have been Magnitude 8. 3) .
Large scale ground failures abounded in the Alaska quake,
with the entire suburb of Turnagain Heights being liquefied and flowed out

-115-

DR. J. DAVID ROGERS

Page 5

OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY BEFORE
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

to sea, destroying some 75 homes. The tidal wave created by the Alaska
Quake damaged California port facilities, particularly at Cresent City.
Damage assessments by structural and geotechnical engineers sent to
Anchorage triggered research moneys and programs to explore seismic design
considerations and building code amendments in the late 196o's.
THE SAN FERNANDO EARTiiQUAKE OF 1971

I

At 6: 15 a.m. on February 9, 1971 , the Los Angeles metropolitan area was
awakened by a sharp jolt of Magnitude 6.4, centered beneath San Fernando,
adjacent to a highly-populated area along the northern side of the San
Fernando Valley near Los Angeles. Two hospitals fell, one dam crumbled,
and three freeway viaduct sections collapsed; interchanges fell where
Highway 14 joins the Golden State (I-5), five spans fell where the Golden
State (I-5) crossed the Southern Pacific Railroad, and the newly-complete,
but unopened, interchange between the Foothill (I-210) and Golden State
(I-5) freeways. Twenty other spans experiences hinge connection failures
of varying degrees.
The collapse of a not-yet-opened, state-of-the-art
structure gained widespread notoriety and caused serious concern amongst
the Division of Highway's Bridge Departments in Sacramento and Los Angeles.
California's first freeway (the Pasadena) had been constructed shortly
before World War II, but the interconnecting system of highways really
began to take off in the mid-1950's with the passage of the Interstate
Highways Act in 1955.
The highway building boom crested in the late
1960' s, and then died a fast death in the early 1970's as the Federal
Highway Trust Fund moneys were impounded to help balance the Federal
deficit, and post-Vietnam inflation made new construction three times as
expensive.
In 1975, CALTRANS laid off 15,000 employees and, basically,
quit building freeways.

I

The largest freeway system in the World had been constructed between 1947
and 1973. It had been designed to accommodate anticipated growth trends
and the Division of Highways had risen to a position of national, if not
world, eminence in setting design, safety, and landscaping standards for
highways.
But, the first sizable earthquake to test the system was at San Fernando
in 1971.
The collapse of the Highway 14 connector viaducts onto the
Golden State Freeway (I-5)miraculously only killed two men heading for
work in a pick-up. Their heirs sued the State, trying, in vain, to prove
negligence on the behalf of the Division of Highways for designing such
structures (the courts eventually determined that the State is immune from
actions alleging design negligence when state-of-the-art engineering
precepts are used, even if these standards are subsequently superseded.}
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Shortly after the San Fernando collapse, the Legislature appropriated sufficient moneys to study the various failures and the Federal Government
followed suit with its own program of research through the National
Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Corps of Engineers, and
the U.S. Geological Survey. Cal Tech and U.C. Berkeley headed the list of
institutions accorded moneys to research the safety of highway viaducts,
dams, hospitals, and nuclear power plants; this topic being of major concern in the 1970's.
By 1977, the results of investigations into San Fernando-caused failures
were complete. In 1973. major amendments to Building Codes were made to
account for better resisting the observed modes of fail-ure in the San
Fernando quake.
Earth dams, built before 1940, using hydraulic filling
techniques, were replaced or buttressed by new, mechanically-compacted embankments. Public schools were evaluated, retrofitted (if possible), and
condemned or sold (for non-school use) if they could not be brought up to
adequate levels of seismic safety.
The Alquist-Priolo Special Studies
Zone Act was passed by the State Legislature in 1973. This Act required
local entities to prepare a Seismic Safety Element of their General Plan,
and required the preparation of special geology reports for proposed construction in known fault zones.
Unfortunately, California's active real
estate lobby axed the additional provisos about any sort of professional
review of the adequacy of such reports.
CALTRANS RETROFIT PROGRAM
Immediately following the San Fernando quake, CALTRANS began retrofitting
their older bridges.
In the following years, CALTRANS received the
results of the university research and began to implement major procedure
changes which included the evaluation of each area's Maximum Credible
Earthquake (MCE) and the corresponding highest levels of ground shaking
such MCE's would cause on any site. CALTRANS contracted with the State's
Division of Mines and Geology to prepare a Maximum Credibl-e Bedrock Accel-eration (Map) from Earthquakes in Cal-ifornia in 1972 (Greensfelder,
1974).
Five weeks after the 1971 quake, CALTRANS embarked on a hinge restoration
program to prevent future pull-out at such connections. Soon, a 3-phase
retrofit program was put into motion to analyze and amend CALTRANS's pre1971 structures. Phase 1 of this program consisted of replacing hinges,
bearing assemblies. and connectors with seismically-resistant designs.
Restrainer cables were used to tie girder sections together to prevent
out-of-phase side sway, excessive opening and "hammering" into each other
after opening. This program was accomplished on the Cypress Structure in
1979, and the Phase 1 program was completed by 1987. The Phase 2 retrofit
program consisted of retrofitting concrete and steel "jackets" on single
column supports to increase shear capacity and confinement so that compressive failures like those seen at San Fernando would be prevented.
This program was being funded at $3 to $4 million per year until the 1987
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Whittier Earthquake, when the I-5/I-605 interchange was damaged.
Suspended sections would have failed, closing the freeways for weeks if
not for the Phase 1 restrainers emplaced between 1971 and 1987 at a cost
of $54 million (Zelinski, 1987). The Phase 2 column support program was
accelerated to a funding rate of $16 million per year ($65 million total).
CALTRANS felt they would have lost the I-5/I-605 interchange if i t had
been supported on single columns in lieu of a 5-column bent (Trombatore,
1987).

•

The Phase 3 retrofit program was intended to apply to more complex,
multi -column structures like the failed Cypress Section of I-880.
Research contracts for this phase had been initiated with U.C. San Diego
in 1987. According to Jim Roberts (1989) of CALTRANS, plans for Phase 3
retrofit were begun in January 1988, but funding levels are currently too
low for Phase 3 retrofits to go to contract (approved funds are all slated
for Phase 2 retrofits). No Phase 3 retrofits had been accomplished prior
to the Loma Prieta Earthquake, but there is CALTRANS's correspondence suggesting that the agency was beginning to take a critical look at such existing structures in San Francisco as late as August of this year (Gates,
1989; Klein, 1989).
A LOOK AT THE CYPRESS STRUCTURE BY U. C. BERKELEY

•

From 1976 to 1981, the author was enrolled as a graduate student in civil
engineering at the University of California at Berkeley. In 1977-78-79, I
was engaged in a series of individual study projects in structural engineering with the late Professor Emeritus, Jerome M. Raphael, a mass concrete and reinforced concrete specialist and former Chairperson of the
Department's Structural Engineering and Structural Mechanics (SESM) group.
Raphael had received his Masters degree at MIT in 1935 and had worked on
the construction and instrumentation of Shasta Dam in the early 1940's
while with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. He joined the Berkeley faculty
in 1953, shortly before receiving the Moissieff Medal from the American
Society of Civil Engineers for his research in concrete stress distribution.
The elevated Cypress structure section of then-State Route 17 was of much
interest to the late Professor because it was such a massive and rather
unique structure. The Cypress Structure had not been designed to account
for creep (or sagging) of the concrete, a favorite topic of research at
Berkeley, going back into the 1930's.
Raphael knew the designers and
spoke to me of them (Panhorst, Mitchell) and the early connection problems
associated with m~x~ng post-tensioned pre-stressed girders with
conventionally-reinforced columns and girders.
My individual research project for the upcoming quarter (Summer, 1977)
would be to research the Cypress Structure, with special attention to the
foundation system and subsurface soils - this being "natural" for me as a
geotechnical engineering major (I was minoring in structural engineering).
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I spent a lot of time making phone calls and trips to the structure to
make measurements and observations of the creep and shear cracking in the
supporting girders. I also researched what I could from CALTRANS via the
phone without spending too much time or money tracking down the construction records.
These were things we intended to do if the project were
funded.
The purpose of the project was to take a preliminary look at the Cypress
Structure, then prepare a research proposal for performing an in-depth
ana'lysis, which other members of the SESM faculty were then embarked.
Some of the items took a long time to track down or wait on the response.
We knew from CALTRANS design history that the structure was probably
designed for a lateral soil acceleration of 0.06 g, typical of that period
{which I believe came from the 1940 El Centro record). The newlypublished bedrock acceleration map by Greensfelder {1974) showed a probable bedrock acceleration at the site of 0.50g, emanating from a Magnitude
7.5 quake on the nearby Hayward fault, just 4 miles away.
We aLso discovered that the structure had withstood a Magnitude 5.3 shock onLy 13-1/2
miLes from epicenter whiLe nearing compLetion on March 22, 1957 {see
C.D.M.G. Special Report 57. 1959).
This 1957 quake had done noticeable damage to the west San Francisco area,
and exerted Modified Mercalli scale intensities of at least VII on the
Cypress Structure.
This intensity would likely have corresponded to a
maximum horizontal acceleration on the order of 0.10g {Murphy and O'Brien,
1977). Professor Raphael felt that the structure could easily sustain the
0.10g load without much damage due to the redundancy of old working stress
design concepts and the increasing strength of the concrete with age (3500
psi mix originally specified). We did not attempt to run a dynamic
analysis on the structure, we only prepared a proposal to do so.
When finished, the proposal included just about everything we had the
ability to do in those days. The northern portion of the structure {north
of Eighteenth Street, or at around Bent 66) was founded upon old fill,
placed on top of an old marine embayment {Radbruch, 1957) .
Borings in
this area revealed soft Quaternary and Holocene-age sediments to a depth
of around 60 to 70 feet up in the vicinity of Bents 105 to 122.
The
freeway's supporting bents were founded upon concrete piles, but some of
these pile groups pierced what appeared to be old estuary infillings and
sinuous sloughs, some of which were filled with sand or gravel.
That knowledge was enough to make us worry about two potentialities:
1.

Partial liquefaction of the slough sands or fill could remove
passive support of the nearby piles and pile snaps could occur
just under the pile cap footing; or
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The presence of deep muds at one end of a long, linear structure, and stiff sandy materials with more shallow piles at the
other, could react differently to incoming shock waves; and/or
could serve to amplify or damp the incoming waves. thereby
complicating the structure's response.

Having been originally trained as a geologist, I emphasized to Professor
Raphael what I had been learning downstairs in geotechnical engineering that the presence of loosely-consolidated materials within a stiffer
"bedrock" depression could generate deadly energy refraction problems.
But, we also knew that the soft marine clays, or so-called "Bay Muds" ,
near the structure's northern terminus, could also serve to "damp" or
lessen the incoming earthquake shock wave (which was something of a comforting thought).
Either way, we ended up concluding that the structure
was going to respond differently at one end versus the other in an
earthquake of extended period (something greater than 15 seconds).
Professor Raphael decided that I should research the costs and possibilities of performing some on-site dynamic excitation tests to get the
s true ture' s periods and modes of vibration (which he believed would be
fairly simple to do), and to perform seismic excitation tests of the foundation, particularly at the north end, atop the estuary deposits.
The
only rig I could find to perform such work was a geophysical testing truck
called a "Vibroseis", which actually stuck large prongs into the ground
and input a constant rate and amplitude of shaking. Geophones, inserted
into or on top of the ground at varying distances away from the Vibroseis
truck, were to measure seismic refraction arrivals.
I remember quite vividly Professor Raphael being concerned about the
tapered columns supporting the Cypress's upper deck. Our proposal had two
figures which targeted the base of these columns as the "weak link" in the
supporting load path.
Raphael was also concerned about the top connections in certain cases, but I cannot remember in what context.
Vertical acceleration was seen to be a potential problem at the column
bases due to excessive shear, and the general knowledge at that time was
that 1950 structures were generally underdesigned for shear stresses induced by compression (it had recently been recognized that a substantive
vertical component of earthquake-induced accelerations had been involved
in the San Fernando quake collapses) .
At the Professor's prodding, I
searched high and low for some historic records or predictions of what
vertical accelerations would be in effect in West Oakland. I spent considerable time in this endeavor and had access to many experts, but came
up with nothing. The frustration of this exercise cannot be too strongly
stated. It was soon apparent that we had very little strong motion data
from actual earthquakes in similar geologic settings.
Strong motion accelographs can record base input accelerations (horizontal and vertical)
as well as structural response. We knew from the records at Pacoima Dam
in 1971 that the location within the structure or above the ground surface
could mean a 10-fold difference in input motion (such as on a sharp
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ridgeline) and in response {such as atop a building). I ended up with a
new appreciation for why engineers use acceleration records of "incorrect"
magnitudes or irrelevant geologic settings, sueh data are oftentimes the
only records available! We concluded that we would have to use the San
Fernando records in our analysis {provided it was funded), even though the
'71 quake style and type {reverse faulting) would not replicate motions on
the Hayward or San Andreas (which are strike-slip faults).
It was our general feeling, at the time, that the Cypress would be most
vulnerable to three types of ground shaking:
1.

Large horizontal accelerations from a close proximity source,
running across the structure {from east to west). This would
be a Magnitude 6.5 to 7.5 event on the nearby Hayward fault.
Shaking levels of 0.30g to 0.55 g could be expected; or

2.

A lower level, but sustained acceleration of 0.15g to 0.30g,
emanating from a large event to the south and propagating up
the length, or axis of the structure. Being very straight and
a mile long on different foundation materials, this seemed a
likely scenario for possible vibration phase synchronization,
or resonance; which is any earthquake engineer's nightmare.
This phenomenon is shown schematically in Figure 1 {from the
proposal);

3.

A moderate to long duration event which would input high verticaL acceLerations (0.05 to 0.20g) which would serve to lift
the bents up and down, thereby promoting a progressive compression failure of the upper columns. This thinking was influenced by some of the failure modes seen at San Fernando.
We were afraid of Rayleigh waves generating such vertical
loads, but lacked sufficient data to take this idea much further.

The linearity of the Cypress bothered Professor Raphael; his feeling being
that some unknown portion of seismic energy waves traveling up the axis of
the structure were sure to be reverberated back, through the structure,
where they could interact with later, incoming waves. The curvature and
bifurcation of the double deck at either end could conceivably damp some
of the return motion, but we felt this was too difficult to model, hence
the perceived need for some on-site vibration testing.
Curved freeway
viaducts with numerous on/off ramp appendages serve to damp incoming seismic waves, as shown schematically in Figure 2. These types of structures
are also very hard to analyze for earthquake response behavior, especially
if they become cracked.
My study of the Cypress dragged on for months.
1978 by the time the proposal was complete.
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The estimated costs were, as I recall:
Phase 1:
a.
b.

c.

Preliminary dynamic analyses
Site-specific work
Cone penetrometer testing at north end
Subsurface sampling, lab testing
Vibroseis work
Determination of structural periods
/modes of vibration
Specific dynamic analysis
Original plans and maintenance
records retrieval
Meet with 1 to 3 members of original
design team or CALTRANS staff
(as appropriate)
Preparation of longitudinal and
bent sections for dynamic analysis;
set up and run
FLUSH program runs to obtain 2-D
soil behavior in earthquake
set up and run north-south motion
and two sections with east-west motion

$10,000
4,500
6,500
8,000
5.500
900
2,200
8,200
4,000

Phase 2:
d.

Evaluate above analyses; decide if
structural modeling required
(elastic to model static modes of vibration;
or plastic to model failure modes)
22,000 to 48,000

e.

Devise retrofit measures, as
deemed appropriate; could include
physical testing of scaled
structures in SESM lab

•
•

10,000 to 50,000

Totals (in 1978 dollars)
$49,800 for Phase 1
$32,000 to $98,000 for Phase 2
These are the figures we arrived at as nearly as I can recall from my file
notes. After I turned the project in, I went on to work on another study
of the heightening of Shasta Dam with Professor Raphael. I recall speaking to him about the status of the Cypress proposal in the fall of 1978,
whereupon he replied that, "there weren't any research funds allocated for
that type of structure", or words to that effect. I knew that the Cypress
had received a Phase 1 retrofit with cable ties and and neoprene cushion
blocks at the expansion joints in the late '70's and early '80's.
However, even with all of my trips out to the structure, I hadn't appreciated the pervasiveness of the hinge joints nor that such joints
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negated moment connections to transmit bending or twist-type loads. I had
assumed that the main reinforcing steel ran through the columns, much like
the modern structures I had observed being built in the 1960's and 1970's.

EXPECTED LEVELS OF SHAKING AT THE CYPRESS STRUCTURE
By the time Greensfelder' s (1974) baserock acceleration map was released
in 1974, Bay Area civil engineers had a good idea that expected shaking
levels were a lot higher than the 0.10g pseudostatic loading we all had
routinely employed. Greensfelder's map only predicted baserock acceleration levels as high as 0. 50g, over a very large zone within which the
Cypress structure lay.
But, a 0. 50g acceleration is very tough to design large heavy concrete
structures to withstand.
The earthquake-induced bending moment on an
elevated structure is proportional to the structure's overall stiffness,
mass, and height above the ground to its center of gravity. By supporting
a heavy box girder 50 feet in the air, the seismic loads are greatly
heightened. The upper supporting girders weighed something like 165,000
pounds apiece, and these supported about 80 feet of box girder roadway
likely weighing around 850, 000 pounds.
The widespread use of pre-cast
concrete reduces the required beam size (and hence, weight), while the additional employment of lightweight concrete aggregate halves the mass
weight. By utilizing modern construction practices, a structure like the
Cypress would probably weight only 40% to 45% of that structure, with a
notable lessening of the seismic loads.
Toward the early 1980's, an abundance of geotechnical engineering and
planning-level documents were available to predict levels of ground shaking from specific MCE's, which varied from area to area. On the East Bay
coastal plain, the MCE event was a Magnitude 7.5 event on the Hayward
fault (C.D.M.G. Special Publication 78, 1987).
This fault runs through
the Berkeley campus, actively creeping and off-setting the Memorial
Stadium, built in 1912. The Hayward is thought to have spawned Magnitude
7.0 tremors in 1836 (near Richmond) and 1868 {near Hayward).
The Hayward fault lies a scant 4 miles from the I-880 Cypress Structure.
Greensfelder's 1974 baserock acceleration map had been updated by C.D.M.G.
and CALTRANS in 1987 (Mualchin and Jones, 1987) and now shows the Cypress
Structure to be just within the 0.50g acceleration.
The 1987 C.D.M.G.
Special Report-78 shows the northern half of the Cypress Structure receiving a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VIII and the southern half getting IX
(on the Merritt Sands, See Figure 3) .
Using correlations published in
Murphy and O'Brien (1977), Mercalli Intensities of VIII to IX would correlate with accelerations of 0.25g to 0.50g (see Figure 4).
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Published correlations, by Seed and Idriss (1982) are commonly used to
back out actual near-surface soil accelerations from predicted bedrock acceleration values.
Such estimates can be made by first going to their
chart relating horizontal distance from fault, quake magnitude, and peak
horizontal acceleration, reproduced herein as Figure 5 (top). In the case
of a Magnitude 6. 5 to 7. 5 tremor on the Hayward fault, 4 miles from the
Cypress Structure, peak accelerations of 0.50 to 0.55g are predicted.
Actual site response can then be estimated by utilizing another, more approximate relationship between rock acceleration and surface acceleration
on particular types of soils, reproduced in Figure 5 (bottom).
In the
case of the Cypress Structure subjected to its MCE on the Hayward fault,
we could expect maximum accelerations of between 0.27g and 0.39g. depending on soil type.
C.D.M.G. Special Publication 78 (1987) went on to warn about the potentialities for ground failure on artificial fill areas, such as the northern half of the Cypress Structure (see Figure 6). The report warns that
the Cypress Structure would likely be damaged enough to prevent the passage of traffic "for several days" in the event of a major quake.
ACTUAL LEVELS OF SHAKING EXPERIENCED DURING TilE LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE
The Loma Prieta Earthquake occurred at 5:04 p.m. on Tuesday, October 17,
1989, just as the third game of a San Francisco Bay World Series was getting underway at Candlestick Park.
Initial reports pegged the quake at
Richter magnitude of 7. 0.
This was downgraded to a 6. 9 several days
later, then recast at an official magnitude of 7.1 some 10 days later,
based on energy release data recorded by far-away stations. Strong motion
(source) shaking was recorded for approximately 15 seconds, although site
response shaking was estimated to be as much as 30 to 40 seconds in some
areas.

I

The quake came as no surprise to those familiar with California seismicity. In 1984, the Division of Mines and Geology (Real, 1984; p. 2-3)
had predicted "odds better than 1 in 2 (>50% probability) that a major
earthquake would occur on the San Andreas Fault between San Jose and San
Juan Bautista (see Real, p 28). The quake was forecast to be a magnitude
6.5 to 7+ event (Real, 1984, p 3). The next most likely quakes had odds
of only 1 in 10 (10%) and 1 in 20 (5%), suggesting that the Loma Prieta
event was 5 times more likely than any other major event in the Bay
Region.
The Loma Prieta Quake will likely be the most well-instrumented quake in
the United States' history. The U.S. Geological Survey expected the quake
sometime soon, so an elaborate network of recording stations (over 400)
was within 200 km of the epicenter.
The style of slippage was unusual
however for the San Andreas. The quake's focal depth was quite deep, 1012 miles, instead of the usual 6 to 8 miles.
The Pacific Plate (Santa
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Cruz side) rose 1.7 meters (5.6 feet) on an inclination of 70 degrees from
horizontal, suggesting mostly dip-slip movement in lieu of the San
Andreas' more usual strike-slip motion (with the western plate heading
north). The rupture energy petered out about 4 km below ground surface.
The theoretical surface rupture would be 5.25 feet vertical and 1.92 feet
horizontal if the offset had propagated all of the way to the ground surface. Geologists have found no such break, only a ridgetop zone of about
9 left-stepping en-echelon breaks across the tope of Santa Cruz Mountains,
just east of the summit of State Route 17.
The largest of the ground
scarps is about 2.3 feet high and exhibits left-lateral motion, suggesting
clockwise rotation and possible ridge spreading. Geologists are now postulating that the fault rupture is disseminated over a broad zone, 1/2 to
1 mile wide with significant "ridge spreading" serving to obscure any
"clean" style of surface rupture.
One of the other benefits to come out of the 1971 San Fernando quake was
the creation of the C.D.M.G. 's Office of Strong Motion Studies which
manages the California Strong Motion Instrumentation Program (CSMIP). At
the current time, several hundred strong-motion records are generated for
any sizable earthquake.
In this manner, localized ground amplification
effects can better be appreciated and MCE' s and planning-level documents
annotated to reflect areas of increased concern. It is only by having an
adequate number of records that site-specific seismic analyses can be generated and tested for validity (the acid test of any analytical procedure
is to see if it will accurately predict previously-recorded or observed
behavior).
The Cypress Structure was located almost exactly 100 km (62 miles) from
the quake's epicenter.
A preliminary evaluation of the available CSMIP
data suggests a marked component of so-called ground enhancement effects,
seen in the recorded acceleration arrivals. Simply put, Oakland got hammered much worse (.18 to .29g) than any other area close in range to the
quake (and on the north side of the fault). San Francisco averaged 0.10g
over 8 reporting stations, with the Presidio skewing even that average
with a 0.21g reading. These strong-motion data (for horizontal accelerations only) are presented graphically in Figure 7.
Ground amplification effects are very apparent in some adjacent stations.
For instance, the recorder on Yerba Buena Island on colluvial sands, but
adjacent to Cretaceous-age bedrock, measured only 0.06g, while the station
on Treasure Island, a man-made appendage to Yerba Buena, registered 0.16g,
or more than 2-1/2 times the acceleration!
In nearby Oakland, vertical
accelerations of between 0.04 and 0.16g were measured, also suggestive of
ground amplification.
In the downtown Oakland area, a cover of young
(Pleistocene and Holocene-age} alluvial and marine sediments is over 400
feet thick in places, lying upon the much older Franciscan Assemblage
bedrock (Jurassic-Cretaceous-age). The actual topographic profile of this
marked bedrock interface and the consistency and dynamic properties of
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those soft geologic fills overlying it needs to be probed more deeply in
the next round of earthquake engineering research (hopefully in the
1990's).

FAILURE OF THE CYPRESS STRUCTIJRE SECTION OF I-880

What follows is a brief description of the observed modes of failure of
the elevated Cypress Structure. These observations were all made within
48 hours of the structure's collapse. The explanations offered are necessarily preliminary in nature, and could, therefore, later be modified or
discarded, depending on what the various investigative teams discover
during razing of the structure.
Eye-Witness Accounts
Eye-witness accounts will be of much value in sorting out the sequence of
failure.
Preliminary accounts, several of which are by civil engineers
who were driving on the structure's upper deck, are summarized below:
1.

The structure was unusually empty at the time of failure (5:04 p.m.
PST).
Traffic speeds on the upper, southbound deck were unlimited
(up to 70 mph).
Traffic on the lower deck was similarly unencumbered, but somewhat slower (reported at 65 mph, but likely closer to
55 mph).

2.

The earthquake shock waves rolled through the structure's longitudinal axis, from south to north.
Like giant ocean waves, the
structure lifted and dropped.
Driving became difficult and some
people slowed, some stopped, and some sped up to get off of the
structure.

3.

Drivers and passengers of vehicles on the upper deck describe seeing
intermittent "puffs" of concrete dust at the supporting bents, indicting explosive crushing, spalling and flexure at those locations.
It is not yet known exactly at what point the puffs of dust occurred
with respect to the seismic wave crests or troughs.
Eye
witnesses/survivors of the lower deck have not been interviewed and
their observations could be of critical importance.

4.

The structure survived shaking long enough that one car of civil engineers from the Alameda County Public Works Department (Danehy,
personal communication) first noticed the quake while somewhere in
the Oakland distribution structure, drove onto the Cypress, saw and
experienced the ground roll "waves" reverberating up through the
structure, the concrete "puffs", and sped up, surviving the trip.
They describe a progressive failure of the upper deck, starting at
its north end, about the time they reached the south end (presumably
across Bent 62, near Eighteenth Street). If this description is ac-

I
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curate, a distance of approximately 1.05 miles was traversed at 55
to 70 mph, beginning at the onset of shaking.
At an average speed
of 62 mph, this trip would take 61 seconds (to reach the relative
safety of the southern half of the structure). This preliminary account would suggest that the failure was progressive and may have
initiated from north to south after the relative cessation of strong
motion ground shaking. Certainly, more accounts need to be analyzed
with respect to timing.

Failure Mode with Hinge Joints at Bottom of Columns
As mentioned at the outset, the Cypress Viaduct's designers had inserted
structural hinges or joints at the top or bottom {or both) of the upper
supporting columns. The hinges were placed at the bottom of the columns
on the conventionally reinforced bents, shown in Figure 8. The 20 No. 18
(2-1/4 inches diameter) reinforcing bars within the upper columns were
stopped just above the hinge joints. A shear key approximately 18" x 26"
with 4 No. 11 dowels and a 4"-diameter copper drain pipe comprised the
connection.
The dowels appear to have extended 24" into either side of
the joint. Expansion joint building felt provided the bond break for the
hinge.
These were applied as two 9" -wide strips parallel to the
structure's axis and two 5"-wide strips on the opposing sides {north and
south).
Just below the hinge, a critical reinforcing detail (shown on Figure 8)
was utilized which provided discontinuous reinforcing steel in the lower
column area above negative moment reinforcing steel coming up the lower
column and turning into the lower supporting girder.
U.C. Berkeley Professors Jack Moehle and Stephen Mahin have identified
this area as the zone of a critical crack" which sheared off in the
failure sequence (see Moehle, 1989). We can infer that the region of the
"critical crack" was an area of potentially high shear stress, noted by
the structure's designers because they called for No. 4 ties at 12" spacings in this area and in the lower half of the upper column, just above
the hinge joint.
In Figure 9, a diagram illustrating a possible mode of failure at the
lower hinges is shown.
As the structure bent lifts and falls with each
earthquake load cycle (combined with the structure's own modes of vibrational response), a high compressive load is concentrated at the joint because there is insufficient tensile reinforcement across the joint to hold
the column together in "negative gravity". Side-swaying motion could induce the same separation (as shown in Figures 14 and 15) .
On a down or
compressive cycle, the outside wedge of discontinuous reinforcement is
spalled off in excessive shear. This outside block {just below the hinge
joint) was consistently found beneath the failed columns as a block approximately 12" thick and about 36 .. square.
Four No. 18 bars, only 48"
long, were consistently noted to be attached to such blocks. The bars had
been cut prior to placement.
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Of the 51 bents that were damaged or failed, 28 of them were of the design
shown in Figure 8. All 28 of these bents failed with the upper deck falling onto the lower deck, as depicted in Figure 10. The upper column toes
failed in shear and kicked outward, with the "critical crack" normally
emanating from the inside of the hinge joint downward, on an approximately
60 degree inclination.

•

In collapsing outward, the columns caught and dragged the outer two rows
of No. 18 rebars reinforcing the lower columns. The upper sections of the
failed columns were pushed inward, ripping their upper moment connections
in compression and exposing the steel and connection details with the upper supporting girders.
Hinge Joints At Top of Columns
As mentioned previously, the Cypress Structure was designed during the
early days of pre-stressed concrete technology.
In instances where
slightly greater spans were needed for skewed railroad/street crossings or
accommodation ramps, the designers had opted to utilize post-tensioned
rods to pre-stress the upper supporting girder and in certain instances
simply added a third base column for the lower supporting girder. In this
manner, the upper girder could be maintained at a constant size, but span
greater lengths or be extended for anticipated expansions. This size constraint was important to maintaining adequate clearance for the lower
traffic deck.
One complication of this system was that it mixed different types of reinforced concrete members.
In Figure 11, a conceptual view of the posttension pre-stress is shown.
If the upper columns were structurally attached to the upper supporting girder, the expected 1" to 3" of prestressed compression could deflect the supporting columns inward, breaking
or overstressing them.
The structure was being constructed from the
ground up. As a consequence of this dilemma, the designers deleted continuous reinforcement through the supporting connections and installed
hinge joints.
Hinge Joints at Top and Bottom of One Column and Top or Bottom of Opposing
Column
In most instances where pre-stressed girders were used, a third hinge was
added at the bottom of either of the upper columns within the supporting
bent. These "doubly-hinged" columns appear to have been emplaced with an
eye toward a planned expansion of the structure, shown diagramatically at
Bents 72 (Figure 12) and 76 (Figure 13). Hinges at the top and bottom of
the western columns would have more easily facilitated their removal
during the planned expansion.
The post-tension rods within these bents
were threaded and capped with an eye toward splicing onto them later (see·
Figure 13).
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In retrospect, a three-hinge supporting system possesses several
deleterious traits during sustained seismic loading. As shown in Figure
14, upon lateral loading by an earthquake, the structure will sway to the
side of the advancing wavefront. The amount of sway and the loads induced
by such ground motion are a function of the structure's stiffness, mass,
and height above ground. In the Cypress Structure, the heavy upper deck
was placed some 50 feet off the ground, raising the structure's center of
gravity to a level nearly coincident with the lower hinge(s). As the bent
deflects in response to primary ground motion (Figure 14), translation or
bending is more easily accommodated at the hinges, therein concentrating
deflection-induced stress at the area of the adjacent column without such
a hinge (as no bending moments are transmitted across the hinges). Large
bending-induced stresses will occur at this juncture which is the only unhinged point on the upper deck load path (Buckle, 1989; Mahin, 1989).
Localized crushing of the concrete on opposing sides of the hinges could
also occur at excessive deflections, giving rise to the concrete dust
"puffs" noted by eye witnesses. After this primary sideways deflection,
the structure would deflect back in an opposing direction, provided it
maintained some degree of elasticity.
The structure could be expected to become more plastic and more sluggish
in its response with increasing cracking.
The corresponding reaction
cycle of an undamaged bent is depicted in Figure 15. Localized crushing
could occur on the opposing sides of the hinge joints on the reaction
cycle and the sense of loading would be reversed on the unhinged section
of column (the lower right portion of the upper supporting column,
depicted in Figures 14 and 15).
Observed failure modes of the three-hinged bents were more complicated
than others described previously. In the vicinity of Bents 71-74 (Grand
Avenue), the viaduct made a 15 degree turn to the north, following the
original trend of Cypress Avenue. The traffic decks were super-elevated,
with the easterly side up-going through the turn (as shown in Figure 13).
In Figure 16, the failure mode in this turn is depicted schematically (but
the super-elevation is not shown). The easterly column on the "high side"
failed in shear with the top, hinged end of the column, impacting on the
street. The failed column pulled off significant reinforcing steel from
the lower base column, suggesting a shearing or tearing motion downward,
before the column head toppled over.
Some of the post-tensioned rods
snapped in the partial collapse of the upper deck. The west side of these
partially-collapsed bents simply leaned over at the upper and lower hinges
with some minor compressive spalling of the inside top of the column.
This spalling likely occurred during collapse of the upper supporting girder and may not have been induced by side-sway during the earthquake. The
surviving hinged columns in this area are relatively undamaged, which suggests that breakage was focused on the area of large bending-induced
stresses depicted in Figure 14.
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Another heretofore unseen failure mode occurred in the
of Bents
to
, towards the southernmost end of the failure. In this area, the
failure appears to have been rapid and catastrophic.
As
in
the
columns on the west side of the bents were
blown clear of the structure, consistently landing on their upper ends.
These columns were found to be virtually intact with the 4 No. 11 dowels
and
copper drain pipe cleanly sheared off at either end. In some instances , however, the dowels are gone and the dowel holes in the column
are
suggesting complete and rapid
The
supporting column on the opposing (east) side exhibits
the consistent mode of failure described previously. The column base has
sheared off and taken off about 20" of the lower outside portion of the
base column. This shearing proceeded for 7 to 8 feet downward, then the
upper end of the column toppled over, impacting the street below.

•

•

A universal observation at the failure site was the apparent survival of
the
base bents (shown in
18). The failure seat Bent
, the second bent south of
is the first in a series of 16 three-column base bents
south which withstood the quake (the Phase 1 restrainer cables
the upper box girder deck).
Within the failed sequence
112), four 3-column base bents (nos. 95-98) were used on
over a Santa Fe
spur in the center of
Bents 95 and 98 lost their upper decks, but 96 and
a delicate sanctuary to those motorists luck enough to be
Much can be learned from studying bents
and 97.
They were
at
the
of the upper columns (to carry a post-tensioned girder, but had a
thicker section at the column bases
of the skew) and were
reinforced
No. 18 bars). Bents
carried the maximum
while 95 and
the transition at skews of
The
skew
increased shear area to the base of the upper
columns which were
cracked, but not failed. The less severe
skew on bents
and 98 were failed in shear at the base of the upper
columns in the manner described in
sections.
factor which remains to be explored is the increased stiffness of
bents.
By their very design, the side sway and center of
somewhat lowered; even though most had upper and lower
and
through 98 did
have lower hinge
). This
increased cross-sectional stiffness of the supporting bents needs to be
in
, non-linear modeling and then compared to the 2-column
base bents.
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sections of the failed Cypress
total colfailure of the upper and lower
This occurred between
Thirty-second Street overand 106/107, just south
The west base column of bent
was noticeably tilted toward
the west. This tilt could be ascribable to foundation failure or it could
outward in the collapse
the two decks, in which case
pile cap. In this section
viaduct was super-elevated
upper column bases were both
This is in the area where an
old
channel parallels the west
of the viaduct
).
Confined channel deposits of saturated
materials could
have lurched or partially liquefied.
evidence of liquefaction or
failure was noted, but such evidence may lie underneath this
anomalous failure area, and this should be examined. During demolition of
the
, sonic velocity tests could be
on the pile cap at bents
see if the column
or piles are
anecdote mentioned
many
of a so-called "ground
in the ocean". This is
19.
We may find
accelerations
about ground enhancement of
validated (as it was in
accelerations alone does
of extensive structures

survivors interviewed is
through the structure
(and not

accelerations cerat
be
in the
different foundation

1985).

materials.

remains to be done
is to glean what
The Cypress was an
in an era which did
The greatest reason
response data, particularly
response
from earthquake-loaded
number
observed in
and
in

new, and heretofore unseen,
the collapse. The Cypress was
the first to fail in an
the San Francisco area sustained
It is very likely that
increased levels of
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as the Phase 2 program received
Had the Loma Prieta quake struck
retrofits
have saved the structure.

later

Whittier
CALTRANS'

that
all of the modern structures
survived the
with little or no damage.
a magnitude 7.0
, but well-engineered
structures possess enough redundancy to survive.
There's nothing inwrong with double-deck freeways so
as then are
to
) standards with proper
considerations.
not designed for
close to the loads that were im-
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Figure 18
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